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NEPAL: FROM PEOPLE POWER TO PEACE? 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
King Gyanendra’s capitulation on 24 April 2006 in the 
face of a mass movement marked a victory for democracy 
in Nepal and, with a ceasefire between the new 
government and the Maoists now in place, the start of a 
serious peace process. Forced to acknowledge the “spirit 
of the people’s movement”, Gyanendra accepted popular 
sovereignty, reinstated parliament and invited the 
mainstream seven-party alliance to implement its roadmap 
– including election of a constituent assembly to rewrite 
the constitution in line with the parties’ five-month-old 
agreement with the Maoists. The international community 
lost credibility by attempting to pressure the parties into 
an unworkable compromise with the king and must now 
work hard to support a difficult transition and peace 
process while avoiding similar mistakes. 
The pro-democracy movement was a victory for the 
Nepali people on four fronts: 
 Over the king. Nepal witnessed changes in mood 
during the several weeks of protests and strikes 
in April but there had long been widespread 
discontent with the king and his direct rule. The 
mass defiance of curfews to march against the 
monarchy following the king’s misjudged first 
offer on 21 April was a decisive popular verdict 
which – even in the face of the massed ranks of 
loyal security forces – left the king with no option 
but surrender. 
 Over the parties. People remained suspicious of the 
parties, both on the basis of their mixed record in 
government and their perceived willingness to 
do a deal with the king against the country’s best 
interests. Nevertheless, most hoped sustained 
pressure would force the parties to provide 
representative political leadership in tune with 
public sentiment – an approach that has so far 
yielded concrete results. 
 Over the Maoists. Maoist support, much as 
mainstream democrats are loath to admit it, was 
crucial to the movement’s success. But people did 
not rally under the Maoist flag, even in rural areas 
where the insurgents had directly urged their 
participation. While most endorsed elements of 
the Maoist agenda they did not heed calls for a 
revolutionary insurrection and sent a strong signal 
that people power is a constraint on the actions of 
the rebels as well as the palace and parties. 
 Over the international community. Nepal is 
particularly exposed to external influence. 
Sandwiched between regional superpowers and 
long dependent on foreign aid, its leaders and 
people have often looked to outsiders at times of 
crisis. This time India, the U.S. and some European 
powers did help to create the environment for a 
democracy movement but were brushed off when 
they appeared to press for an unpopular solution to 
end the crisis. 
The fact that the people at large, rather than purely party- 
or Maoist-organised action, forced the king’s final climb 
down puts them in their rightful place at the centre of 
Nepal’s politics and acts as a powerful constraint on 
misbehaviour by the major players. That they did so in 
the face of a coordinated international campaign to halt 
the protests means they need not be beholden to outside 
forces – this was a victory they won for themselves. 
That they successfully encouraged the parties to stand 
firm against the ill-advised external pressure bodes well 
for fostering genuine national ownership and direction 
of a peace process and constitutional reform. 
The people’s movement vindicated the parties’ November 
2005 twelve-point agreement with the Maoists, without 
which the movement would never have been possible. 
It also conclusively rejected the proposition that 
reconciliation between the palace and the parties to fight 
the Maoists was the only way forward. Encouragingly, 
the parties and the Maoists have reaffirmed their 
commitment to their joint peace plan. Solid self-interest 
underlies the twelve-point agreement; though there is no 
guarantee, implementing it successfully is still the most 
attractive option for both sides. 
Nepal’s much maligned political parties have recovered 
much of the popular credit they had squandered while in 
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office and while leading the earlier half-hearted “anti-
regression” campaign against royal rule. However, the 
initial moves to form the new government were less 
inspiring, with squabbling over the allocation of ministerial 
portfolios delaying the process. The government of 84-
year old Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, who was 
sworn in on 30 April, is only an interim administration, 
with limited legitimacy to act in areas other than pursuing 
the existing roadmap for ending the conflict. It faces four 
immediate challenges: 
 keeping the peace process on track; 
 containing the king and controlling the army; 
 planning for constitutional change; and 
 responding to calls for transitional justice. 
The international community will win back respect 
in Nepal if it helps the government as it tackles these 
challenges in an environment which remains precarious. 
The country is not yet back to business as usual. Donors 
must understand that their role should be to safeguard 
the difficult transition from people power to peace. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To India, the U.S., the European Union and 
Other Members of the International Community: 
1. Coordinate an approach based on explicit shared 
principles including:  
(a) establishing a Contact Group and 
complementary Peace Support Group, with 
the role of the latter all the more important 
now that a peace process is underway; 
(b) accepting that Nepal’s people are the drivers 
of international engagement and that in 
the changed domestic political environment 
its parties, civil society groups and other 
representatives are in a better position than 
before to make their own suggestions; 
(c) recognising that peace is the priority 
and “do no harm” the golden rule, while 
development agencies should continue 
to abide by their own Basic Operating 
Guidelines in order to keep pressure on the 
government and Maoists to do likewise; 
(d) holding a possible follow-up to the 2002 
London conference on Nepal, perhaps 
modelled specifically as a Peace and 
Development Forum and requiring inclusive 
preparation and participation; the plan of 
Nepali civil society activists to start the 
process by organising their own conference 
in Kathmandu at the end of June deserves 
support and serious participation; and 
(e) ensuring inclusive and participatory 
development, both to address the root causes 
of the conflict and to ensure that development 
agencies’ activities no longer reinforce 
socially, ethnically or regionally exclusive 
models as they sometimes have in the past. 
2. Make stability and peace, not reforms and increased 
development, the top order of business, recognising 
the need to: 
(a) avoid rushing into ill-considered “peace 
dividend” packages since poorly planned 
injections of cash and other support could 
well be counterproductive; 
(b) remember that the new government is fragile 
and interim, its legitimacy based on popular 
support for a peace process, not a full-
fledged government with legislative and 
governance capacities; 
(c) acknowledge that development assistance 
cannot be separated from the political 
situation and processes and ensure that 
political analysis informs any aid planning; 
and 
(d) evaluate government reach and administrative 
capacity in the districts, which is at least as 
important as change in top-level political 
environment. 
3. Support the peace process by: 
(a) helping monitor the ceasefire, if requested, 
and starting practical planning now for a 
small mission; 
(b) preparing to assist both armed parties with a 
gradual demobilisation and demilitarisation 
process; 
(c) using development and humanitarian 
assistance to consolidate peace by delivering 
services and opening up space for economic 
development;  
(d) encouraging international financial 
institutions to give the highest priority to 
macroeconomic stability and transparency 
rather than forcing ambitious reform 
proposals on the interim government; and 
(e) considering funding a thorough professional 
auditing of government, palace and military 
expenditure by reputable international 
accountants. 
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4. Conduct relations with the monarchy in accordance 
with the following principles: 
(a) political leaders should meet with the king 
only if requested to do so by the government; 
(b) countries with monarchies should resist any 
temptation to reward Gyanendra for his climb 
down with continued engagement, which 
would only further erode international 
community credibility; and 
(c) Kathmandu-based diplomats should resist 
the temptation to rehabilitate royal cronies 
responsible for the worst excesses of royal 
rule. 
5. Engage carefully with the security sector in 
accordance with the following principles:  
(a) no resumption of lethal aid, especially now 
that the bilateral ceasefire renders it 
unnecessary; 
(b) channel all contacts through the civilian 
government, with engagement with the 
military predicated on concrete steps being 
taken to operationalise democratic control; 
(c) pressure to be maintained for full and 
transparent investigation of human rights 
abuses, including unresolved cases of 
forced disappearance, and for adequate 
sentencing of those convicted; 
(d) assistance to build politicians’ and civil 
servants’ professional management capacities; 
(e) support for the voluntary suspension of new 
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions 
until Royal Nepal Army human rights abuses 
are satisfactorily investigated and concrete 
steps taken to demonstrate democratic 
control; and 
(f) support for the civil police, who need to 
be strengthened to play a crucial role in 
maintaining law and order during the 
ceasefire. 
6. Respect that transitional justice is a sensitive area 
where national ownership and decision-making is 
crucial but be prepared to offer the government 
the benefit of experiences in other countries and 
technical input, as the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has begun to do 
by volunteering to share with legitimate authorities 
the findings of its own investigations into abuses. 
7. Avoid competing for involvement in the 
constitutional reform process and heavy-handed 
assistance that could compromise the essential 
principle of a popularly endorsed constitution, but 
as requested by the government: 
(a) support a people-driven process, assisting 
where requested in funding or technically 
facilitating public consultations and a wide 
national debate; and 
(b) prepare to provide more detailed technical 
assistance where appropriate. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 10 May 2006 
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NEPAL: FROM PEOPLE POWER TO PEACE? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The pro-democracy movement of April 2006 transformed 
Nepal’s political landscape but is only the start of a lengthy 
and challenging road to peace.1 The movement was 
remarkable for the breadth of popular participation and the 
speed with which it gathered momentum – both beyond 
the expectations of the mainstream parties and the Maoists. 
This report offers a preliminary analysis of the course of 
the movement and outlines the changed positions of the 
main political players – including the Nepali people – in 
the new situation created by the king’s climb down. 
The movement was neither fully planned nor fully 
spontaneous. It was founded on the loose political alliance 
forged by the parties and the Maoists in November 2005 
and the hope that their joint peace plan had aroused in a 
population increasingly disillusioned with the multiple 
failures of royal rule. The protests belonged to the 
mainstream Seven-Party Alliance (SPA)2 in name but 
owed more to the Maoists in practice. While playing a 
quiet – and largely non-violent – role, it was their activists 
who were best equipped with plans and an overall political 
strategy. 
Nevertheless, despite fears that the protests would invite 
chaos, a collapse of state authority and an immediate rebel 
takeover, the Maoists were not able to push the movement 
to a sudden republican conclusion. This was partly because 
Gyanendra ultimately saw sense and surrendered power 
at the eleventh hour – something the Maoists were not 
alone in doubting he would manage – and partly due to 
the inherent conservatism of the mainstream parties, who 
were happy to accept a deal that at least deferred judgement 
on the monarchy’s future. 
 
 
1 For reporting on the early stages of the pro-democracy 
movement, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°49, Nepal’s Crisis: 
Mobilising International Influence, 19 April 2006. All Crisis 
Group reporting on Nepal is available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
2 The parliamentary parties which make up the seven-party 
alliance are the Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Part of 
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML), Nepal Sadbhavana 
Party (Anandi Devi), Nepali Congress (Democratic, NC(D)), 
Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP) 
and United Left Front. 
But credit for the relatively stable transition to date must 
go largely to the demonstrators themselves. Despite 
incitement from Maoist activists and provocation from 
sometimes trigger-happy security forces, the massive 
crowds rarely became violent themselves. There were 
no full-scale riots, little destruction of property and, 
bar repeated stone-throwing, very few serious assaults 
on security personnel or government officials. However, 
the popular mood demanded more than the new SPA 
government seems willing to give. Keeping the public on 
board will be a major challenge, as will ensuring wide 
and transparent public participation in discussions about 
constitutional reform and plans for a post-conflict Nepal. 
For the international community the overriding lesson 
of the 2006 people’s movement is that crude efforts at 
political intervention against the current of popular feeling 
will fail. Kathmandu-based diplomats – including, 
when prey to Delhi politics, the otherwise well-informed 
Indians – have demonstrated the limitations of their 
political judgement. Still, the role they have to play 
now requires not sophisticated political analysis but rather 
measured and principled support for Nepal’s legitimate 
leaders as they seek to implement their popularly endorsed 
roadmap. 
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II. PEOPLE POWER 
A. THE FOUNDATIONS 
There were two main bases for the movement: popular 
discontent prompted by the repeated failures of the king’s 
direct rule and hope that the twelve-point agreement 
between the mainstream parties and the Maoists would 
bring peace.3 In March 2006 the SPA and the Maoists 
reaffirmed commitment to their November 2005 deal.4 
This was the immediate impetus for the April movement. 
1. The parties’ plans 
The parties were all too aware that their earlier efforts at 
sparking a mass movement had failed. The proposed mass 
rally of 20 January 2006 had been easily blocked by a 
tough security clampdown. Their failures could largely be 
attributed to a breakdown in communication and planning 
with the Maoists. The parties were not strong enough to 
organise a genuine mass protest alone and, in the absence 
of a coordinated plan, Maoist attacks in the Kathmandu 
valley and across the country helped the royal government 
justify its crackdown.5 
The first question the parties faced was whether to attempt 
a traditional strike/shutdown or a mass movement. The 
two were partly contradictory: a shutdown would prevent 
the parties themselves from mobilising people and thereby 
obstruct the chances of building a mass movement. The 
parties initially had low expectations for the strike they 
ultimately decided upon. Even as it got underway they 
were not confident that it would hold solidly for the 
originally scheduled four days (6–9 April).6 
A further issue was whether to aim for centralised or 
decentralised protests. At the start, the Nepali Congress 
strongly insisted on a major show of the strength in the 
capital, originally slated for 8 April. But the UML pushed 
instead for decentralised demonstrations around the 
country, which was the plan finally chosen. 
Party leaders did not want to repeat the mistake of simply 
allowing the government to arrest them in advance of the 
strike and thereby defuse the movement with little effort. 
 
 
3 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005. 
4 The SPA leaders and Prachanda released the same statement 
separately on 19 March 2006. 
5 The Maoists attacked police posts at Thankot and Dadhikot, 
on the outskirts of Kathmandu, on 14 January 2006, killing 
fourteen policemen. See Crisis Group Asia Report No111, Nepal: 
Electing Chaos, 31 January 2006. 
6 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
This time key leaders went into hiding in advance and, for 
once, successfully communicated their plans to colleagues 
so that some arrests and the anticipated shutdown of phone 
services were not as disabling as before. 
The parties did not move many workers around the 
country but were surprisingly successful at mobilising 
their supporters in Kathmandu and other areas. Some 
were brought into the capital from outside, partly with the 
support of affiliated trade unions and youth movements 
but these in themselves did not amount to a critical mass. 
The major parties had sent officials from the centre to tour 
the country in the weeks leading up to the strikes and boost 
their local organisations. 
2. The Maoist role 
The Maoists’ role was critical and consistent with their 
evolving political strategy. Following two years of 
difficult internal discussions, the October 2005 plenum 
approved the policy of eventually joining multi-party 
politics.7 At the same time as showing a commitment 
towards democracy, the plenum also decided to target 
urban centres, using both military measures and political 
mobilisation. This new urban focus left them better 
prepared to boost the movement in Kathmandu and other 
cities. 
For the Maoists, the October 2005 plenum also marked 
the end of the first phase within their concept of “strategic 
offensive”. This first phase, which began in August 
2004 and had been devoted to boosting their political 
and military weight in the capital, had been largely 
unsuccessful. The Maoists were unable to mobilise 
in urban areas and their large-scale military assaults, 
apart from the attack on a poorly defended army road 
construction camp in Kalikot in August 2005,8 had little 
impact. 
The second phase sought to address these weaknesses by 
using the loose alliance with the mainstream parties to 
increase political leverage and reshape military strategy.9 
The Maoists had hoped to make a joint appeal with the 
parties for the general strike – negotiators agreed in Delhi 
but Girija Prasad, Nepali Congress president and de facto 
leader of the SPA, refused.10 Still, they knew that throwing 
 
 
7 Prachanda, press statement, 28 November 2006. 
8 The attack was on 7 August 2006. See Prabhakar, press 
statement, 8 August 2006. 
9 The plenum adopted a new military strategy of “standing on 
the spine to strike the head” – the spine referring to highways 
and supply routes, the head to urban areas, mainly Kathmandu. 
See Crisis Group Report, Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
10 In the end they released the same statement separately. 
Interview with Girija Prasad Koirala, The Kathmandu Post, 
3 April 2006. 
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their weight behind the movement would bring them 
benefits, even if the parties claimed sole ownership. 
The Maoists’ plans to support the movement were more 
concrete than those of the parties. They included: 
 Blockades to support the shutdown. On 14 
March 2006 the Maoists had already announced 
a nationwide program to blockade district 
headquarters and major highways.11 However, once 
the parties prepared their shutdown the Maoists 
announced they would support it and withdraw 
their unilateral action.12 
 Military pressure. Since their October 2005 
plenum, the Maoists had not only restructured their 
military but also had started assembling large 
numbers of armed and political cadres in the Gandak 
and Lumbini region.13 As part of the restructuring, 
they created a Special Central Command for the 
Kathmandu region, a party committee that controlled 
a military division. Planning revolved around the 
possibility of a mass insurrection. Although they 
doubted one was immediately likely, they were 
prepared to launch large attacks in and around the 
Kathmandu valley if the situation demanded.14 
Maoist chairman Prachanda heeded the parties’ 
call not to disrupt their peaceful movement with 
violence in the capital15 but they wanted to be 
ready to strike if state retaliation prompted serious 
disorders which they could exploit.16 
 
 
11 Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, press statement, 18 
February 2006. 
12 Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, press statement, 19 March 
2006. 
13 The Palpa attack of 31 January 2006 was part of this process. 
See Prabhakar, press statement, 1 February 2006. They also 
attacked the central Tarai district of Sarlahi on 5 April 2006. 
“Sainik helikaptar dhwasta”, Samaya, 13 April 2006. 
14 The Maoists had planned a major military assault somewhere 
inside the Kathmandu valley during 6-9 April 2006. Some 
of their divisions were moved towards Kathmandu from the 
western command, under the leadership of Deputy Commander 
Prabhakar, who was based in the Gandak region, mainly in 
Palpa, for several weeks. Crisis Group interviews, Maoist and 
state security sources, April 2006. In the end, there was only one 
major Maoist attack during the period of the movement, on a 
communications tower in Chautara, Sindhupalchok district, just 
north of the Kathmandu valley on 23 April. Its political intention 
was not clear. “Maoist rebels attack Chautara”, ekantipur.com, 
24 April 2006. 
15 Prachanda, press statement, 3 April 2006. 
16 Deputy Commander Prabhakar was reportedly unhappy with 
the Kathmandu ceasefire. When he withdrew his forces towards 
the west, the RNA suspected they might regroup for a major 
attack somewhere between Palpa and Rolpa-Rukum. Crisis 
Group interview, military intelligence source, April 2006. 
 Political mobilisation. The Maoists deployed 
political workers in Kathmandu and all other urban 
centres to incite the public, boost demonstrations 
and provide political direction to otherwise 
unguided masses.17 They sensed that anti-monarchy 
sentiment across the country had made the time ripe 
for a more overtly republican campaign. Rather 
than the abstract slogans of “anti-regression” and 
“full democracy” that the mainstream parties had 
used, they encouraged the adoption of populist 
republican slogans, especially those directed 
personally against the king and his unpopular son, 
Crown Prince Paras. 
 Creating a rural uprising. Although the general 
strike was led, at least nominally, by the mainstream 
parties, the Maoists are dominant across the 
countryside and their support and active direction 
was required to mobilise the rural population. They 
encouraged villagers to participate in protests not 
only in their own locality but also in district and 
regional headquarters. They planned as well to 
bring large numbers into the capital but that did not 
happen.18 
 Maintain their public relations offensive. The 
Maoists were determined to build on the gains they 
had made in recent months by presenting a more 
compromising face to the world. Although they 
were tempted to break with the parties when refused 
a share in the call for a shutdown, this was a 
major factor in persuading them to be flexible 
and accommodating. They issued press statements 
drawing attention to their support for a peaceful 
movement and then declared a ceasefire in the 
Kathmandu valley – a step that may or may not 
have been in their original plans. They also issued 
their strongest ever public commitment to respect 
human rights,19 while skilfully using both the Nepali 
and international media to improve their image. 
 Holding their own mass meetings. The Maoists 
used the party-led general strike to continue their 
own political mass mobilisation in parallel to the 
efforts to support the parties.  
B. THE PRESSURE MOUNTS 
The scale of people-participation as the strike took hold 
surprised both the parties and the Maoists. Much as they 
had worked to instigate the movement, they were neither 
 
 
17 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
18 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist sources, April 2006. 
19 “Maobadidvara manavadhikar evam manaviya siddhantaprati 
pratibaddhatako ghoshana”, Janadesh, 18 April 2006. 
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solely responsible for its sudden growth nor fully in control 
of it. 
1. Parties in control? 
Initially, party cadres and leaders were hardly seen in the 
protests and very rarely in the lead. Party flags, a staple of 
any organised demonstration, were few and far between. 
Most corner meetings, rallies and marches were 
spontaneous, managed by local activists or instigated 
by Maoist cadres rather than guided by central party 
planning.20 The participants were overwhelmingly ordinary 
people, neither hardcore mainstream party or Maoist 
supporters. They were largely from those classes that 
had supported democratic politics and would probably 
still vote for mainstream parties if given the choice. 
Activists from the parties’ various fronts – student and 
youth wings, affiliated trade unions, women’s wings and 
the like – were involved but did not appear to be working 
according to a coordinated strategy.21 When senior leaders 
did eventually start joining the protests, they did so as 
ordinary participants. There were very few speeches and 
traditional corner meetings. It was only after the king’s 
second announcement that the key leaders even appeared 
in public. Nevertheless, party leaders were keen to insist 
that the movement remained under their guidance, not that 
of the Maoists – leading to a very public disagreement 
between G.P. Koirala and Maoist spokesman Krishna 
Bahadur Mahara on the BBC Nepali service on the 
evening of 10 April.22 
2. Maoist mobilisers 
The Maoist role in intensifying the movement was vital. 
By the time Prachanda announced the Kathmandu valley 
ceasefire, hundreds of unarmed rebels had already entered 
the valley.23 While they publicly supported the SPA 
program and even carried mainstream parties’ flags and 
banners, they were in fact driving the movement from 
within. They concentrated on encouraging the use of 
republican slogans and inciting the crowds to a more 
confrontational mood.24 They hoped to change the nature 
 
 
20 Crisis Group interviews and observations, Kathmandu, 
April 2006. 
21 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
22 “‘This is our joint programme’: Mahara; ‘No, it is our own 
movement’: Koirala”, nepalnews.com, 11 April 2006. 
23 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
24 There were few reported instances of deliberate violence 
against the security forces. In Gongabu there were unconfirmed 
reports of a khukuri and steel rod attack on police officers, 
something the police did not believe could be attributed to 
mainstream party supporters. Crisis Group interview, police 
officer, Kathmandu, 15 April 2006. On 16 April, protestors from 
of the movement, for example by planning to snatch 
security forces’ weapons during clashes, believing that one 
or two such incidents would create a snowball effect.25 
On 9 April Prachanda announced a six-point program 
to support the ongoing movement: (i) continuing 
demonstrations in defiance of any government restriction; 
(ii) destroying royal statues around the country;26 (iii) 
removal or defacement of official signboards bearing the 
title “His Majesty’s Government”; (iv) supporting local 
declarations of a republic;27 (v) urging people not to pay 
taxes; and (vi) controlling the highways by force.28 
Maoist activists brought their experience to bear in 
organising blockades on valley roads by felling trees and 
building other obstacles. Their aim was to provoke a 
violent reaction from the security forces and be ready to 
exploit any chaos. They also organised corner meetings, 
using different names at various locations in central 
Kathmandu during the curfew. One was organised at 
Maitidevi just in front of army (RNA) troops under 
the banner of the “Peaceful Struggle Committee”; at 
Ghattekulo a Maoist cadre who spoke disguised himself 
as a local leader of NC (Democratic).29 
The Maoists were the main provocateurs in Gongabu, 
another centre of protests on the Kathmandu ring road. In 
Lalitpur, a Maoist cadre, Dinesh Chapagain, was injured 
by police gunfire and hospitalised for four days.30 
Meanwhile, the Maoists enforced a near-total blockade, 
 
 
Kirtipur, scene of an impressive peaceful mass meeting on 10 
April, brandished sticks at a rally in Balkhu. 
25 Crisis Group telephone interview, Maoist source, April 2006. 
26 Not many statues were damaged, partly because guarding 
them has long been a priority for the security forces. However, 
there was a symbolic destruction of a statue of Gyanendra 
that was under construction in Nepalgunj on 18 April. See 
“One demonstrator dies, 100 injured during demonstrations 
on Tuesday”, nepalnews.com, 19 April 2006. A statue of Kanti 
Rajya Laxmi, King Gyanendra’s mother, was destroyed at 
Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur on 7 April. See “Nation tense, 
300 arrested in valley”, ekantipur.com, 7 April 2006. In Butwal, 
a statue of King Mahendra, father of Gyanendra, was destroyed 
on 6 April. See “250 held, 2 dozen injured in districts”, 
ekantipur.com, 6 April 2006. Following the success of the 
movement, demonstrators placed political flags on the statue 
of Prithvinarayan Shah at the main entrance to the Singha Durbar 
government complex. Following such incidents, RNA soldiers 
were deployed to guard statues in place of poorly armed police. 
27 This happened first and most prominently in Chitwan but did 
not catch on. See “Fleeting ‘republic’ in Nepal”, The Telegraph, 
9 April 2006. 
28 Press statement, Prachanda, 9 April 2006. 
29 Crisis Group observations, Ghattekulo and Maitidevi, 
Kathmandu, April 2006. 
30 Interview with Lekhnath Neupane, Maoists student front 
ANNISU (R) chairman, Jana Aastha, 3 May 2006. 
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assisted by the government’s own curfews. As supplies 
became scarce, the sense grew that the government had 
lost control. 
By this stage, the Maoists’ student wing, the ANNISU 
(Revolutionary), had formally announced it was actively 
participating in the movement.31 Its president, Lekhnath 
Neupane, had started working within the Kathmandu 
valley some days after the beginning of the strike, as had 
the chief of the Maoist teachers’ wing, Gunaraj Lohani.32 
The Maoists may well be behind various “independent” 
republican fronts, such as the Ganatantrik Sanyukta 
Morcha (United Republican Front), an eleven-member 
organisation coordinated by Ishwar Paudel and involving 
Maoist supporters, which was announced at an 18 April 
press conference in a Kathmandu hotel.33 
As well as participating in SPA-led rallies, the Maoists 
became bolder in organising their own open mass 
meetings. They held one on 24 April on the main 
highway in Pathari Bazar, Morang, close to the RNA’s 
eastern divisional headquarters at Itahari.34 Maoist First 
Division Commissar Dinesh Sharma (aka Sagar), 
Chhintang-Sukhani Memorial Brigade Commissar 
Sandhya and other leaders addressed the crowd. The 
Maoists also sent hundreds, if not thousands, of people 
from Rolpa, Rukum and Salyan districts to participate in 
the anti-monarchy demonstrations in Ghorahi, Dang.35 
3. Wide participation 
Broad popular participation was the defining feature of 
the movement. However, various categories of protestors 
joined the protests at different stages and with different 
motivations. 
Professionals. Many professional associations supported 
the movement and mobilised their members. These 
included some (such as lawyers and journalists) who had 
been protesting for months and others (such as doctors 
and teachers) who had been critical in the 1990 democracy 
movement but had, until now, been relatively silent. When 
cinema stars and popular singers also came out in protest, 
it was clear that the movement had gained critical 
mass. By the last days, usually apolitical development 
professionals and even embassy employees joined 
demonstrations.36 
 
 
31 Press statement, ANNISU (Revolutionary), 15 April 2006. 
32 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist sources, 20 April 2006. 
33 “Ganatantrik vidyarthi ekjut”, Jana Ekta, 24 April 2006. 
34 “Morangma ganatantrik sabha”, www.krishnasenonline.org, 
16 April 2006. 
35 BBC Nepali Service news, 22 and 23 April 2006. 
36 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 18-22 April 2006. 
Civil society. Many key civil society leaders had been 
imprisoned since well before the start of the protests. 
Leaders of the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and 
Peace such as Devendra Raj Panday and Krishna Pahadi, for 
example, had been in detention since the 19 January 2006 
roundup.37 Nevertheless, their earlier efforts – organising 
meetings and rallies across the country in the many months 
of relative inactivity by the political parties – were one of 
the essential bases for the movement. As the protests 
grew, civil society groups continued to play a political role, 
partly by issuing statements urging the party leaders to 
appreciate the popular mood38 and partly by organising 
some demonstrations.39 
Media. Domestic press, radio and television coverage was 
significant in boosting the movement – something not 
there in 1990. Hourly FM radio bulletins kept people well-
informed and did much to undermine the government’s 
cut-off of mobile phones. Television news not only showed 
impressive crowds around the country but also fuelled 
popular anger at the government’s violent response. For 
example, Kantipur TV’s juxtaposition of the image of a 
critically injured protestor at Kalanki with King Gyanendra 
welcoming Indian envoy Karan Singh to the splendid 
comfort of his palace became a common talking point.40 
Human rights workers. Members of national human 
rights organisations – such as COCAP and INSEC – 
showed bravery in monitoring clashes between protestors 
and security forces and acting as on-the-ground observers 
to prevent abuses. This also had a political significance: 
probably not one of the hundreds of human rights 
observers in Kathmandu was on the royal government’s 
side. Given their commitment to democratic principles, 
their presence could never be entirely impartial, but it could 
give protestors a further sense of support. Human rights 
workers also disseminated information about protests, both 
by word of mouth and by reports and photos that were 
widely distributed over the internet and electronic media. 
The civil service. The movement gained further 
momentum when government bureaucrats started to 
participate, a previously unthinkable development. The 
first were employees of critical government corporations, 
such as the Nepal Telecommunications Corporation and 
Nepal Electricity Authority, and staff who shut down the 
national bank almost completely. Local administration 
officers in the districts stopped work; some palace-appointed 
regional and zonal administrators, as well as nominated 
 
 
37 See Crisis Group Report, Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
38 “Open letter to ambassadors from Duwakot detainees”, 
www.insn.org, 23 April 2006. 
39 “Civil society leaders detained inhumanly”, ekantipur.com, 
9 April 2006. 
40 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 21-22 April 2006. 
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District Development Committee chairmen, fled or went 
into hiding. The families of security forces joined very 
public demonstrations, as did retired soldiers and police 
officers. All this boosted the morale of other demonstrators 
and paralysed state machinery. Even senior civil servants 
in the home ministry went on strike to protest the state 
violence for which they were theoretically responsible. 
The business community. The palace had looked to 
the business community as one of its few solid pillars of 
support but discontent had slowly been growing since the 
royal coup.41 Those running small businesses were the 
first to join the protests, partly because they had time on 
their hands due to the enforced strike. Even taxi drivers, 
normally the first to complain about a shutdown which 
affects their earnings, were universally supportive. One 
by one, district chambers of commerce and industry 
declared their support for the movement.42 Tourism 
entrepreneurs protested, first individually and then under 
the banner of their trade associations, and even five-star 
hotel workers wore black armbands and held brief strikes. 
Private banks and other key industries voluntarily closed. 
Private school associations declared they would only 
reopen after the return of democracy. 
The general public. From the start, it was noteworthy that 
people for once did not complain about the shutdown. 
Those who simply counted the crowds as an indication of 
the movement’s strength underestimated its reach. There 
were at least four categories of participation: (i) organisers 
and instigators (mainstream party, Maoist or independent); 
(ii) active participants – those on the streets, chanting 
slogans, marching; (iii) indirect participants – onlookers 
and hangers-on, those giving water or other help to 
demonstrators; and (iv) silent supporters, who may have 
stayed at home but supported in other ways; for example, 
the large sums raised very quickly, but in multiple small 
donations, for injured protestors’ medical relief were a 
sign of the depth of public support.43 Youth and students 
were prominent, many not from political backgrounds. 
Some critics have suggested that the predominance of 
younger people implies an easily excitable mob but it 
reflects Nepal’s demography – half of the population is 
under the age of 25. 
 
 
41 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°41, Nepal: Beyond Royal 
Rule, 15 September 2005. 
42 This support was emotionally strengthened when security 
forces killed Govinda Nath Sharma, a former central member 
of the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, in a protest in Parbat district on 21 April 2006. See 
Surya Thapa, “Jasle mrityu swikare”, Himal Khabarpatrika, 29 
April 2006. 
43 Crisis Group observations, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
4. The capital encircled 
Kathmandu’s ring road, not the city centre, became the 
fulcrum of the movement for a number of reasons, the 
first practical. The earlier small demonstrations within the 
central residential neighbourhoods were blocked when 
they reached main roads and unable to link up into larger 
gatherings. The traditional focal points such as Ratna Park 
or Durbar Marg were well guarded by security forces. 
The ring road became more clearly defined as a boundary 
within which curfews were imposed, making it natural for 
protestors to gather around its edges. 
As the strike took hold, citizens of the small town of 
Kirtipur just outside the ring road grabbed the headlines. 
On 10 April they sat on the road to block the RNA’s 
armoured personnel carriers.44 On the same day Kirtipur 
was host to a remarkable mass meeting, as thousands 
gathered to listen to speeches by university teachers, 
politicians and civil society activists, as well as an 
extemporaneous poetry recital by a young student that 
captivated the nation when it was replayed on television. 
Once well-developed pockets of protest developed in 
locations such as Gongabu and Kalanki, it was easier for 
organisers to bring them together to create larger crowds. 
The first such gathering was on 15 April, when separate 
small rallies joined up in the Balkhu area, generating a 
crowd in the tens of thousands. The police responded 
with tear gas and rubber bullets, injuring dozens including 
former NC minister Savitri Bogati. The next day 
processions from Kalanki and Kirtipur again met at Balkhu 
and tried to enter the city. Police rubber bullets injured 
twelve demonstrators. 
The increased numbers of protestors and the violent 
responses fuelled each other. The first major clash in the 
Kathmandu valley was at Gongabu on 11 April, when 
police fired live bullets on unarmed demonstrators from 
the house of Assistant Inspector-General of Police Rup 
Sagar Moktan – the incident that perhaps most fuelled 
the movement.45 The killing of three demonstrators at 
Kalanki on 20 April, while avoidable, was a logical 
extension of the trend. 
But the ring road’s significance was more than just 
practical. Kalanki is the main entry point to the city for 
 
 
44 Crisis Group interviews, Kirtipur, April 2006. 
45 The Kathmandu Post photojournalist Prakash Mathema was 
awarded the Shreedhar Acharya National Award for Journalism 
for his picture of a pistol being fired from Moktan’s house. The 
photograph was published immediately on the internet and 
appeared in the 12 April 2006 issues of The Kathmandu Post 
and Kantipur, illustrating the power of the media in fuelling 
public anger. “World Press Freedom Day observed”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 4 May 2006. 
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most travellers from the rest of the country, where the 
road from the Kathmandu valley’s western pass at Thankot 
reaches the capital. Gongabu houses the long-distance bus 
park and has long had a mixed population, including many 
transient residents staying in cheap hotels and rented 
accommodations. These locations symbolised the 
dominant role in the movement of outsiders and migrants 
rather than settled Kathmanduites. 
The surrounding villages contributed many protestors. The 
non-urban parts of the valley (known locally as kanth) 
retain a class and social character very distinct from 
the cities and which was evident in many protests.46 
Mobilisation outside the city centre gave the parties an 
added benefit: they could show their continued strength in 
areas close to the capital but largely beyond the reach of 
the urban-focused civil society movements.47 
Kathmandu’s Newar community did not appear to 
participate with anything approaching the intensity 
of 1990, when the government’s loss of control over their 
areas in the city centres was a tipping point. This may have 
been partly due to the detention of well-known Newar 
leaders (such as Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Mathura Shrestha, 
Malla K Sunder and Shyam Shrestha) but more likely 
reflected continuing disillusionment with the record of the 
mainstream parties. There were efforts to mobilise the 
Newar community. For example, a Democratic Newar 
Struggle Committee formed on 15 April organised a small 
rally in Asan the following day, and one representative 
body, the Jyapu Mahaguthi, appealed to Newars to stand 
up for human rights.48 
Despite a significant presence at the large Kirtipur 
demonstrations, however, the core Newar areas of 
Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur were not pivotal. This 
was reinforced by the symbolism of the masses from 
outside entering the city, when large crowds finally broke 
the curfew cordon on 22 April. It was the threat of mass 
encirclement of Kathmandu by multiple demonstrations 
around the ring road planned for 25 April that gave the 
king his final deadline. 
C. WHY THE PALACE GOT IT WRONG 
1. The counter-strategy 
Despite its efforts to look unruffled, the royal government 
had long been worried that a people’s movement might 
succeed – this is why it was willing to sacrifice further 
 
 
46 Crisis Group interviews, various Kathmandu ring road 
locations, April 2006. 
47 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
48 “Newar community take to streets”, The Kathmandu Post, 
17 April 2006. 
international sympathy with mass arrests on 19 January. 
According to one report, the home and defence ministries 
spent Rs 810 million ($11.3 million) in the six months 
before April to prevent parties from mobilising.49 This 
was meant to pay for extra informers and security 
planning but, with little requirement for accountability, 
much was embezzled once it had been distributed. 
Home Minister Kamal Thapa led the government’s 
political counter-offensive. From well before the strike 
began, he repeatedly claimed that the Maoists were 
using the political parties to foment urban insurrection.50 
This argument, while not entirely false, was poorly 
calculated in terms of its public reception – few people 
believed it and many more were incensed by the way 
Thapa used it to pretend that ordinary people were not 
against the royal government. Beyond this there was no 
political strategy to speak of. When the protests reached 
a critical mass, the king was reduced to rehearsing his 
old tactics of appointing puppet prime ministers. 
Thapa and other palace advisers believed the government 
could still control the demonstrations and ride out the 
storm by a combination of the methods used repeatedly 
since the royal coup: arresting leaders, shutting down 
communications, imposing a curfew and using well-armed 
troops to cow the people. They remained confident that 
most Kathmandu residents were still disillusioned with 
the mainstream parties and would not respond to the call 
to rise in protest.51 This was a reasonable assumption 
on the basis of the parties’ earlier efforts but ignored 
the underlying mood and overestimated the tolerance for 
Gyanendra’s misrule. 
The government did realise that a heavy-handed security 
response would be counter-productive. It issued strict 
instructions to security personnel to avoid lethal force 
at all costs, especially in the Kathmandu valley. In 
many cases the handling of demonstrations was coolly 
professional despite the tensions. 
2. Tactical failures 
In total there were eighteen confirmed deaths during the 
nineteen-day agitation.52 The first was in the eastern plains 
 
 
49 Kedar Subedi, “Andolan dabauna ru. 81 karod”, Himal, 29 
April-14 May 2006. 
50 “Atankavadiko sapana ra abhishta sarkarle saphal huna 
dine chhaina: grihamantri”, Gorkhapatra, 25 March 2006. 
51 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
52 The demonstrators who were killed are Dashan Lal Yadav, 
50 (killed in Rajbiraj); Bhimsen Dahal, 34 (Pokhara); Tulasi 
Chhetri (Chitwan); Shiva Hari Kunwar, 22 (Pokhara); Bishnu 
Pande, 32 (Nawalparasi); Hiralal Gautam, 25 (Bara); Setu B.K., 
25 (Nepalgunj); Rajan Giri (Jhapa); Suraj Bishwas, 26 (Jhapa); 
Dipak Kami, 21 (Kalanki, Kathmandu); Basudev Ghimire 
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town of Rajbiraj. UML cadre Dashan Lal Yadav was 
seriously injured by police shots on 5 April and died in 
hospital. The killing of a Tarai native fuelled the 
movement in the surrounding areas. The tourist town of 
Pokhara became another hotspot after the army killed 34-
year old Bhimsen Dahal on 8 April. When security forces 
opened fire on angry mourners at the funeral in his home 
town of Banepa, 30 km from Kathmandu, a 22-year-old 
youth was killed. Sentiment was further inflamed 
when the army killed demonstrators in the eastern district 
of Jhapa on 19 April. This incident provoked angrier 
protests in Kathmandu, and on the following day three 
protestors were killed at Kalanki, the first deaths in the 
capital. By then the public mood had decisively shifted, 
and many protestors started carrying portraits of the 
“martyrs” rather than party symbols.53 
The king’s own behaviour alienated many from the start. 
He had spent around two months in his lakeside palace at 
Pokhara, where he moved on 17 February, reportedly on 
his astrologer’s advice. When he released his traditional 
Nepali new year’s message on 14 April – his first public 
statement since the general strike started – he made no 
mention of the protests and gave no hint of concern. 
This did him no favours with the public. Such errors 
of judgement were only compounded by the security 
forces’ unapologetic response to the killing of protestors. 
They forcefully seized the body of one protestor killed at 
Kalanki on 20 April, Deepak Bishwakarma, from a local 
hospital to do a post-mortem without consulting doctors 
and relatives. The body of Bhimsen Dahal, killed in 
Pokhara, was sent to his home district, Kavre, without 
informing his wife. There are allegations that the army 
has concealed the bodies of two unnamed protestors.54 
 
 
(Kalanki, Kathmandu); Pradyumna Khadka, 32 (Kalanki, 
Kathmandu); Sagun Tamrakar, 18 (Banepa, Kavre); Yadav Lal 
Lamichhane, 55 (Bardiya); Govinda Nath Sharma, 53 (Parbat); 
Mohammed Jahangir, 23 (Tripureshwar, Kathmandu); Anil 
Lama (Chabahil, Kathmandu) and Chandra Bayalkoti 
(Tripureshwar, Kathmandu). Five of these died of injuries after 
the completion of the movement. Locals also allege that the 
RNA has yet to hand over the bodies of two protestors who 
were killed by the army in Jhapa on 19 April. The Nepali media 
and political parties have declared 21 “martyrs” to date: those 
confirmed killed, the two suspected additional Jhapa deaths and 
UML activist Umesh Thapa, who was killed during a protest in 
Dang on 8 February. During the movement, 6,000 protestors 
were injured, fifteen lost their eyesight, sixteen received serious 
head injuries and 150 in Kathmandu suffered broken arms 
and legs. “House passes motion on probe commission”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 5 May 2006. 
53 Crisis Group observation, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
54 See Govinda Pariyar, “Swatantrataka lagi utsarga”, Samaya, 
4 May 2006. 
The government had not imagined that so many ordinary 
people would be willing to defy curfews. But the lengthy 
curfews angered people in a way that the party strike had 
not and meant that the government could be blamed for 
the shortages of essential commodities and disruption to 
daily life. Curfews were initially timed to enable workers, 
in particular civil servants, to do a full day’s work. However, 
their cumulative effect was to hasten the collapse of basic 
administration as bureaucrats took their cue from the 
general shutdown and increasingly opted to stay at home. 
Neither security actions in the cities or the districts limited 
Maoist activities. There was no concerted effort to lift the 
blockade of major highways (although one or two small 
convoys went into Kathmandu). A few Maoist activists 
were arrested in the capital but these were only a fraction 
of the insurgents active in the valley. Their Lalitpur district 
secretary Ramesh Regmi (aka Amar), of Jamunapur, 
Chitwan, was arrested on 17 April;55 Rajkaji Maharjan 
(aka Deepak), of Sunakothi, Lalitpur, and Bhairab Bahadur 
Bhandari, of Thansingh, Nuwakot, were picked up at 
Gongabu on 18 April.56 However, these arrests did not 
fundamentally disrupt Maoist efforts. Even when Maoists 
led demonstrations under their noses, the security forces 
did not react. 
3. Missing ministers 
As the movement gained intensity, the lack of a planned 
political strategy became all the more evident and 
crippling. Unlike in 1990, there were almost no efforts to 
fight back. In 1990 “retaliation committees” were set up 
in each district to organise pro-Panchayat events and 
target opponents; panchas were required to hold rallies in 
support of the system, and mandales (pro-palace thugs), 
were sent to beat up and intimidate demonstrators. 
In comparison, the government’s rearguard action in April 
2006 was almost nonexistent. Kamal Thapa, Nicchhya 
Shamsher Rana and their supporters tried unsuccessfully 
once to organise a pro-government rally.57 Gangs of 
Crown Prince Paras’s violent supporters – who had been 
active in the preceding months – were nowhere to be 
seen.58 Some loyalists later complained that no palace-
appointed local official, or those elected under palace 
patronage in the February 2006 municipal polls, dared 
 
 
55 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
56 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. Nepal 
Television also showed a Maoist cadre who had been arrested 
on 16 April during a seven-party protest program in Pokhara. 
57 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 20 April 2006. 
58 There were reports of funding and other assistance given 
by the government to mandale groups (see, for example, “Free 
NTC CDMA sets for vigilantes”, The Himalayan Times, 7 May 
2006) but this appears to have been ineffective. 
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show their faces in opposition to the movement.59 They 
also blamed the cabinet political committee, composed of 
a handful of key ministers, for failing to come up with any 
plans. 
By the king’s first proclamation, on 21 April, key 
ministers had gone into hiding and were no longer able 
to perform basic departmental duties. As the king was 
speaking on state television, Home Minister Thapa gave 
his police escort the slip and disappeared. Only after an 
intensive search was the army able to track him down 
and force him to come to RNA headquarters to fulfil basic 
administrative responsibilities, such as signing curfew 
orders.60 No ministers appeared in public to back the 
king’s first proclamation. 
After a long silence, the ministry of foreign affairs briefed 
ambassadors on the afternoon of 24 April. Officiating 
Foreign Secretary Hira Bahadur Thapa apologised for the 
lack of communication and made a half-hearted effort to 
support the king’s earlier proclamation, although all those 
present realised it had failed.61 Foreign Minister Ramesh 
Nath Pandey, who had earlier delighted in making such 
presentations, was absent. His last official action before 
going into hiding, like that of Education Minister Radha 
Krishna Mainali, was reportedly to remove incriminating 
files from his office.62 
 
 
59 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
60 Crisis Group interview, home ministry official, Kathmandu, 
29 April 2006. 
61 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 24 April 2006. See 
“MoFA briefs foreign diplomats on royal proclamation”, 
nepalnews.com, 24 April 2006. 
62 “Ministers take away ‘official documents’”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 26 April 2006. Pandey denied that Report, Letter, The 
Kathmandu Post, 27 April 2006. If Mainali did remove 
documents, they could have related to the use of mandale 
vigilantes, who have traditionally been recruited and managed 
through state sports institutions under the control of his ministry. 
III. FROM KING’S GAMBIT TO 
CHECKMATE 
A. THE FIRST CRACKS 
After almost two weeks of growing protests, the palace 
realised that simply riding out the storm would not work. 
Something had to be offered to the parties but the king 
still planned to use his established divide-and-rule tactics. 
The aim was to craft a compromise that would tempt the 
more cautious, conservative elements in the mainstream 
parties and defuse public agitation. Palace emissaries were 
dispatched to frantic negotiations with sympathetic royalist 
politicians. The big names – Surya Bahadur Thapa, 
Pashupati Rana, Lokendra Bahadur Chand and their like 
– had refused to back the royal coup but might rally round 
if the king offered concessions in a last-ditch effort to 
salvage a continuing political role for the monarchy. 
Former Nepali Congress Prime Minister Krishna Prasad 
Bhattarai had long been the palace’s ideal choice for the 
next puppet prime minister. He was summoned to meet the 
king and made encouraging comments to the press: that 
he was a royalist at heart and sure democracy would soon 
be returned. But stern advice from his party colleagues 
and others persuaded him to resist the royal gambit.63 
In the meantime, a concerned international community 
was stepping up pressure on the king to offer a sensible 
deal to the parties. When New Delhi decided to send Karan 
Singh, a senior Congress politician and son of the last 
Maharaja of Kashmir, as a special envoy to reason with 
Gyanendra, other major powers held back in the hope that 
this would succeed. Singh arrived in Kathmandu on 19 
April, met senior party leaders (UML General Secretary 
Madhav Nepal was released from detention shortly after 
he landed), and then had a lengthy private conversation 
with the king the following day. After expressing hope for 
a quick resolution, Singh cancelled the remainder of his 
scheduled visit and returned immediately to New Delhi.64 
Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee continued 
discussion with the king on 21 April, and SPA leaders 
privately agreed that they would accept the offer of a 
restored parliament. However, the king made no such 
explicit offer, although palace advisers may have believed 
that restoration of parliament was implicitly accepted in 
Gyanendra’s promise to abide by the advice of the new 
prime minister.65 
 
 
63 John Cherian, “King-size crisis”, Frontline, 22 April 2006. 
64 “King sends Karan packing”, The Telegraph, 21 April 2006. 
65 The king had consulted Attorney-General Laxmi Bahadur 
Nirala before his announcement. Nirala may have advised that 
a new SPA government with executive power could simply 
demand that the king restore parliament. “Govt under Article 
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The circumstances of the king’s first proclamation had 
already suggested to the parties that the offer was not in 
good faith. Most political prisoners, including the many 
non-violent civil society leaders and human rights defenders 
who had been imprisoned without trial, remained in 
detention. Two senior UML leaders, Jhalanath Khanal 
and Bamdev Gautam, were arrested at the airport on their 
return from New Delhi, just hours before the proclamation. 
Until the last minute, the efforts to persuade Bhattarai to 
accept the post of prime minister continued; only his 
refusal forced grudging acceptance that an invitation to 
the seven-party alliance was the only remaining option. 
Once this became clear, there was discussion inside the 
palace about the announcement of a constitutional 
assembly, but with pre-conditions.66 
Despite the extremely tense situation – tens of thousands 
of angry protestors were defying the curfew on the streets 
of Kathmandu and had breached security cordons – the 
king did not consult the parties before his announcement 
or even give them advance warning. This cast doubt on 
whether he genuinely wished a smooth handover. Had 
he been sincere, a stable transition would have required 
negotiating the deal, ensuring the parties were ready to 
respond and making an immediate announcement of the 
handover to the agreed new government. 
When the king finally appeared on national television in 
the evening of 21 April, he offered to return executive 
power, “which was in our safekeeping”, to the people. He 
proposed to do this by inviting the SPA to nominate a 
candidate of its choice for prime minister. This met with 
an immediate angry response on the streets and deep 
scepticism from political leaders. 
The international community, which had been pressuring 
the king both privately and publicly to compromise and 
restore democracy,67 rushed to endorse the royal proposal 
without waiting to hear the response of Nepal’s people and 
their representatives. India’s foreign ministry promptly 
welcomed Gyanendra’s “intentions to transfer all executive 
powers of the state to a government constituted by the 
alliance of the seven political parties”.68 The U.S. urged the 
parties to respond quickly by choosing a prime minister 
 
 
35 can make political decision: AG Nirala”, nepalnews.com, 
24 April 2006. 
66 This option was, however, discarded. Crisis Group interview, 
palace source, Kathmandu, April 2006. 
67 Earlier in the day, U.S. Ambassador James Moriarty had 
called in reporters to say that the king’s “time is running out… 
Ultimately the king will have to leave if he doesn’t compromise. 
And by ‘ultimately’ I mean sooner rather than later”, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/04/21/nepal.ap/in
dex.html 
68 “Statement on Nepal”, Ministry of External Affairs, 
New Delhi, 21 April 2006. 
and a cabinet.69 China welcomed the king’s move in 
similar terms.70 British Foreign Office Minister Kim 
Howells welcomed the announcement, calling on the 
parties “to work constructively together to establish this 
government”.71 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued 
a more circumspect statement, hoping that the king’s move 
“will result in the speedy restoration of democratic order, 
an end to the conflict and the establishment of lasting 
peace through an inclusive process of dialogue” but not 
specifically welcoming it.72 Such subtleties were, not 
surprisingly, lost on the crowds and given little attention 
by the Nepali media.73 
B. PARTIES REJECT THE OFFER 
However, the offer was flatly rejected by the people at 
large and the seven-party alliance. Despite their patchy 
record in government and opposition, the parties judged 
the country’s mood well and made a principled and 
practical stand. Their refusal of the king’s offer earned 
them renewed popular trust and put them in a position to 
guide the next round of protests responsibly. 
The king’s proclamation had been carefully crafted to 
showcase cosmetic compromises. While the international 
media duly reported that he had offered to back down and 
return power to the people, the proclamation made few 
concessions and was framed provocatively. The parties 
turned it down on the following grounds: 
 The king explicitly rejected the parties’ roadmap 
for peace, which is based on a freely-elected 
constituent assembly that would write a new 
constitution. This is at the core of the parties’ 
November 2005 agreement with the Maoists and 
is a fundamental condition for the insurgents to 
disarm and enter mainstream politics. It is the 
only realistic plan to deal with the Maoists: there 
is no military solution – the military’s counter-
insurgency efforts have only strengthened the 
rebels. 
 The king offered only a return to the status quo 
ante of January 2005, in other words, guaranteeing 
 
 
69 “King Gyanendra’s April 21 Speech”, statement by Sean 
McCormack, spokesman, Department of State, 22 April 2006. 
70 Gopal Sharma, “Part victory, part protest on Nepal streets”, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/B164965.htm. 
71 “Howells welcomes king of Nepal’s commitment to hand 
power to political parties”, statement of British Foreign Office 
Minister Kim Howells, 21 April 2006. 
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73 For example, see “UN, US, EU and Canada welcome royal 
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a new prime minister only as much job security as 
the three previous incumbents since he first took 
power in October 2002, each of whom he appointed 
and dismissed at will. This is a point made by 
former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, who 
notes that he was appointed in June 2004 on this 
basis only to be dismissed and imprisoned by the 
king in February 2005. 
 Despite the misleading “unofficial” English 
translation circulated by the palace, the king made 
no reference to the people being the “source of 
sovereign authority”. In fact he referred only to 
“state power remaining with the people”, though the 
1990 constitution expressly affirmed the people’s 
sovereignty.74 
 The king made no mention of restoring the House 
of Representatives. Without this it was not clear if 
the cabinet would have legislative authority, and 
there was no guarantee that ordinances and other 
measures introduced by the king since February 
2005 could be reversed. Restoration of parliament 
has been a long-standing party demand: the king’s 
silence was significant as routes to restoration, 
even if agreed by a new cabinet, all pass directly or 
indirectly through the palace via its influence over 
the judiciary. 
 The king did not speak of control of the RNA. 
Even under the 1990 democratic constitution, the 
army remained under de facto royal control, and it 
has been his primary source of power, essential not 
only for carrying out the February 2005 coup but 
increasingly involved in administering the country. 
A government not in control of the army would 
inherently lack authority and be susceptible to 
being undermined by the palace. 
 The king made no offer, explicit or implicit, to 
refrain from using Article 127 of the constitution, 
which has been central to his exercise of authority 
and unilateral arrogation of sweeping powers. He 
has interpreted this article as granting unlimited 
licence to legislate by decree in the absence of a 
parliament. 
 The king’s reaffirmation of his “unflinching 
commitment to constitutional monarchy and 
multiparty democracy” rang hollow in view of his 
actions to dismantle democracy by unconstitutional 
means. 
 
 
74 This simple tactic was enough to confuse the U.S., leading 
the State Department to report, “We are pleased that King 
Gyanendra’s message today made clear that sovereignty resides 
with the people”. “King Gyanendra’s April 21 Speech”, 
statement by Sean McCormack, spokesman, U.S. Department 
of State, 22 April 2006. 
Retention of the current council of ministers – many of 
whom are widely reviled and were indicted for their part 
in suppressing the 1990 democracy movement – did 
nothing to return stability. Blaming the political parties 
for not accepting his call to “enter into a dialogue in the 
interests of the nation” did not help build trust. The 
proclamation as a whole was couched in self-justifying 
terms and reaffirmed the primacy of the king’s plans, 
as outlined in his February 2005 takeover speech and 
subsequently. 
The proclamation was also poorly calculated to gain 
popular acceptance. The opening insistence that the 
people supported his coup and subsequent actions was 
contentious. People did not expect an explicit apology but 
were hoping for at least a hint of regret. The reference to 
the dutifulness, valour and discipline of the security forces 
in “upholding their glorious traditions” left a bitter taste in 
the mouths of those who had been deeply distressed by 
the killing of a dozen peaceful protestors and injury of 
hundreds more in the preceding days. 
C. DIPLOMATIC MISCALCULATIONS 
The diplomatic community’s concerted efforts to pressure 
the parties to accept the king’s offer were, in the kindest 
possible interpretation, founded on a serious misreading of 
the national mood and the choices open to the mainstream 
political leadership. India, China, the U.S. and UK made 
a deliberate push to support a compromise between the 
parties and the monarchy. Some other countries supported 
this line but several key donors, such as Japan, Switzerland 
and Norway, opted for a judicious silence until they had 
judged the domestic reaction. 
The European Union issued a statement that had been 
agreed by its Kathmandu heads of mission on the morning 
of 21 April.75 The statement itself made no mention of the 
king’s offer but Austria’s foreign ministry, responding to 
enquiries from journalists, welcomed the king’s move on 
behalf of the EU Presidency without consulting other 
member states – an ill-judged move that several diplomats 
believe underlines the need for better EU coordination 
through the appointment of a special representative.76 
Nevertheless, EU envoys in Kathmandu fell in line with 
the British position and went jointly to press the parties 
to accept the king’s offer on 22 April. UN endorsement 
of the king’s offer, as noted above, had been more nuanced 
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76 Crisis Group interviews with EU diplomats, Kathmandu, 
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but there were still anti-UN placards at demonstrations, 
and staff of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) reported criticism from ordinary 
protestors.77 
These efforts were doomed to failure. The parties’ reading 
of the king’s proclamation left them no room for 
compromise – unless at the cost of sacrificing public 
credibility and the chance to control the mass movement. 
Once the demonstrations of the following day had shown 
this decisively – Kathmandu saw the largest crowds and 
the broadest public participation since the start of the 
movement – it was the diplomatic community that had 
sacrificed credibility. Party and civil society activists, many 
of whom had looked to the outside world for support 
following the royal coup, felt betrayed.  
“There is no reason for us any more, if there ever was, 
to feel that our international friends and partners are 
wiser and smarter than us just because they have money 
to distribute”, wrote civil society leader Devendra Raj 
Panday. “The concerned donors and diplomats…exposed 
their lack of knowledge and sensitivity about this country, 
its history and its people and their aspirations so thoroughly 
that they have little right to expect us to listen to their 
misplaced messages that will no doubt come our way again 
and again”.78 Political commentator C.K. Lal warned 
that the “disconnect between domestic politics and 
international pressure is starker than it has ever been”.79 
“I and many others were staggered that our representatives 
in Kathmandu actually believed that compromise with the 
king was still possible”, wrote Michael Hutt, one of the 
most respected academic experts on Nepal. “Does our 
government, not to mention the U.S. and the EU, properly 
understand the internal political dynamics of the countries 
to which it donates aid?”80 One Western ambassador 
offered a belligerent response to such criticism, stating 
that “it is Michael Hutt who does not understand 
Nepal” and accusing him of “believing implicitly in the 
newspapers and unfounded interpretations of what we 
said from leftist xenophobes”.81 
Why did the diplomatic community get it so wrong? 
Limited research and reporting. Few diplomats made 
on-the-ground assessments of the scale, mood and 
intention of the demonstrations in Kathmandu. On the 
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79 C.K. Lal, “A royal delusion”, Nepali Times, 23 April 2006. 
80 Michael Hutt, “A People’s Peace”, Guardian Unlimited, 4 
May 2006, available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ 
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81 Email communication, 5 May 2006. 
evening of the king’s 21 April proclamation, the instant 
reaction of the crowds – enraged cries of “betrayal” and 
“deception” – should have been enough to indicate the 
likely popular rejection of the king’s offer. Embassies did 
not go out of their way to keep a close eye on the situation, 
and in some cases key personnel were absent. Security 
concerns led the U.S. to concentrate on evacuating its non-
essential staff and stay away from the demonstrations. 
Inadequate analysis. Diplomats had a clear idea of their 
own preferences but had difficulty putting themselves in 
the place of the party leaders and appreciating the pressures 
and calculations they faced. Once the direction of the 
country started to depend on the sentiment of the people 
at large rather than the manoeuvres of a small political 
elite, the diplomatic community’s isolation from ordinary 
Nepalis became a critical weakness. 
Excessive Kathmandu focus. Concentration on events in 
the capital distracted from the significance of the mass 
popular uprisings across the country. There is some logic 
in this – Kathmandu has long been the crucial fulcrum for 
any major political change. But the mood of the country 
as a whole drove the people’s movement, and diplomats 
either had little access to independent accounts or, in the 
case of major donors, failed to utilise their countrywide 
connections through development activities to full effect.82 
Until 2005, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
was the only agency to base foreign staff full-time outside 
Kathmandu (apart from some missionary organisations and 
volunteer development workers). Subsequently, OHCHR 
has added to the international presence on the ground: 
were it not for its work, there would have been almost no 
independent reporting of developments outside Kathmandu. 
Law-and-order perspective. Too many diplomats had 
long assessed the possibilities of a successful popular 
movement in terms of a tactical skirmish: if the army stop 
them from entering the centre of Kathmandu, how can 
demonstrations threaten the king? How could protestors 
storm the palace? Such an approach led to the 
miscalculation that sensible management of the protests 
would defuse a situation that essentially was a law and 
order, rather than a political issue. “Look at how few 
people there are out on the streets today”, commented a 
Western diplomat monitoring the protests on Sunday, 
23 April. “The security forces have learned from their 
mistakes and won back control of the streets. The heart 
has gone out of the movement – the king will probably 
feel emboldened to withdraw his offer”.83 
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Stability over principles. Despite having had more than 
a year to rehearse the argument that returning to the status 
quo ante of January 2005 would never work, diplomats 
were happy to seize the chance of a compromise that 
offered precisely that. “I know this is only a return to 
January 2005 at best”, said a Western diplomat, “but what 
more could the king have offered? The parties simply have 
to accept this”.84 Such a calculation was based partly on 
the longstanding desire to protect the monarchy at all costs 
and partly on exaggerated fears that continued protests 
would invite mob violence, uncontrolled rioting and an 
immediate Maoist takeover. This calculation was crucially 
inverted: the dangerous scenarios would all have been far 
more likely had the parties accepted the king’s offer and 
lost all credibility with the crowds. In choosing apparent 
stability at the expense of the basic democratic principles 
that their public statements had long supported, diplomats 
fell into the same trap that led to the king’s power-grabs 
of October 2002 and February 2005 – and had invited 
greater instability. 
Overconfidence. Key diplomats wrongly assumed they 
understood Nepal and its politics better than Nepal’s own 
politicians or people. As late as the morning of Monday, 
24 April, when palace insiders and the RNA knew that 
a major new concession was the only remaining 
option, a senior Western envoy was still warning that the 
demonstrations could “fizzle out” and leave a “triumphant 
king”. The parties’ demand that the king cede sovereignty 
showed they were still in the “old mind-set”; had they 
accepted his offer the king could not have blocked their 
agenda, “at least in the first few weeks”. Civil society 
leaders who had also urged rejection of the king’s gambit 
had failed “to grasp the significance of the people’s 
movement and the way revolutions work … [they] risk 
being swept away by the revolutionaries”.85 
D. THE FIRST ACT ENDS 
Saturday, 22 April was the day on which the people’s 
movement secured victory, at least in the short term. Far 
from pouring oil on troubled water, the king’s proclamation 
had, in the Nepali phrase, added ghee to the fire. People 
poured onto the streets in greater numbers than ever, 
determined both to send a message to the palace by 
defying the curfew and to let the party leaders know 
compromise was not an option. 
Kirtipur, the small and independent-spirited town outside 
the capital that had earlier hosted one of the most 
impressive peaceful mass meetings, was deserted. “No 
one’s here. We’re all heading to Kathmandu”, said young 
 
 
84 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, 22 April 2006. 
85 Email communication, 24 April 2006. 
men walking toward the ring road. “We want a republic – 
everyone’s supporting that now”.86 Crowds breached the 
security cordon around Kathmandu’s twin city, Patan, and 
picked up numbers as they moved downhill towards the 
bridge into the capital. “We’re marching on the palace”, 
shouted exuberant protestors above the din of anti-king 
slogans.87 
The security forces had other plans. Accepting that they 
could not secure the entire city despite the curfew orders, 
they channelled demonstrators onto a circular route that 
allowed them to skirt the central areas before ending up 
back on the ring road. In some places army and police 
officers were relaxed. “Nowhere is quiet today; there are 
lots of people out everywhere. So we’re letting them cross 
the bridge – you can carry on, too, it’s peaceful”, said an 
RNA officer.88 But the inner security ring was to be held 
at any cost. Next to the national stadium, sandals littered 
the ground where a crowd had been fired on and fled.89 
Truckloads of well-equipped soldiers stood ready, proudly 
confirming that they belonged to the Rangers Battalion, 
the RNA’s most effective counter-insurgency troops, 
armed and trained by the U.S.90 
At one point on the route taken by the largest procession, 
a Western military expert estimated the crowd that had 
passed him numbered some 200,000 to 300,000.91 In the 
meantime the SPA had also decided formally to reject the 
king’s offer, politely refusing to follow the advice of EU 
envoys who had attended their meeting at Girija Prasad 
Koirala’s residence to argue for compromise. By the time 
a torrential rainfall dispersed many protesters in the middle 
of the afternoon, the battle had been won. 
The palace had pursued a disastrous course since the royal 
coup, progressively alienating large sectors of society 
until even its core supporters joined the pro-democracy 
movement. But its political nerve-endings were not entirely 
deadened. Palace insiders realised the decisive rejection 
by the parties and people of the king’s proclamation left 
them with little option but to give in to the movement’s 
substantive demands, at least on paper. Sunday was 
devoted to frantic negotiations within the palace and, via 
both public and secret intermediaries, with party leaders. 
Ambassadors were again summoned to the palace, and 
this time their advice to back down gracefully before it 
was too late was heeded. Given the hostile domestic 
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reaction to their intervention following the king’s first 
proclamation, ambassadors may have felt a renewed 
sense of urgency in impressing on the king the seriousness 
of his situation.  
The king was forced to make a second proclamation, 
the text agreed in advance with the SPA leadership. 
In a humiliating retreat, he used the language of his 
opponents, recognising the “spirit of the ongoing people’s 
movement”. This proclamation was substantively different 
to the half-hearted first offer: 
 it recognised that sovereignty is inherent in the 
people; 
 it called for resolving the conflict and other problems 
facing the country “according to the road map of 
the agitating seven-party alliance”, implicitly 
accepting the parties’ twelve-point agreement with 
the Maoists and policy of electing a constituent 
assembly; 
 it announced restoration of parliament, a 
longstanding party (though not Maoist) demand; 
and 
 the king offered “heartfelt condolences to all those 
who have lost their lives in the people’s movement” 
and wished the injured speedy recovery. 
Initial reaction on the streets and from the parties was 
positive. This time the diplomatic statements welcoming 
the announcement were in tune with most public opinion 
and that of the mainstream parties. But the new situation 
carries its own risks and challenges. 
IV. PARTIES AND PLANS 
A. THE ALLIANCE VICTORIOUS 
1. Consensus or divisions? 
SPA leaders promptly welcomed the endorsement of their 
roadmap in the king’s second proclamation.92 However, 
their policy response had not been fully prepared. The 
king’s new offer raised issues that could lead to splits – not 
least over the restored parliament’s agenda, composition of 
the cabinet and handling of both longer-term constitutional 
change and the more immediate demands for transitional 
justice. The SPA met on the morning after the king’s 
proclamation at the residence of Girija Prasad Koirala. 
The party leaders unanimously resolved: 
 to make elections to a constituent assembly the 
main agenda of the reinstated parliament; 
 to remain committed to the twelve-point 
agreement and urge the Maoists also to abide by it; 
 to include the Maoists in an interim government 
once elections for the constituent assembly were 
confirmed and a disarmament process had started; 
 to constitute a high-level commission to investigate 
state abuses against pro-democracy protestors; and 
 to declare null and void all “unconstitutional 
decisions” taken by the royal government.93 
Nevertheless policy differences soon began to appear. A 
coalition partner, the UML, argued for a quick transition 
to a republic. Its central committee on 29 April called for 
the names of the government and the RNA to be changed, 
respectively, to “Nepal Government” and “Nepalese 
Army”, removing references to “his Majesty” and “Royal”. 
It also called for the army to be made responsible to 
parliament, not the king, and for dismissal of the royal 
council.94 The SPA, however, has not yet taken a collective 
decision for election to a constituent assembly without 
conditions and for republicanism. The leader of the Nepali 
Congress, an important member of the alliance, favours a 
ceremonial monarchy.95 
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Formation of a cabinet should have been a relatively 
simple process but it was delayed both by Koirala’s 
illness and by bickering over the allocation of ministerial 
portfolios. When seven appointments were announced on 
2 May, the Nepali Congress had reserved major posts for 
itself. More radical party leaders and activists were 
concerned that key positions were given to perceived 
royalists, K.P. Oli of the UML (deputy prime minister) 
and Ram Sharan Mahat of the Nepali Congress (finance 
minister).96 Of Oli, senior Maoist ideologue Baburam 
Bhattarai warned that “to imagine that he will implement 
the line of constituent assembly and democratic republic 
honestly and effectively is the same as believing that you 
can milk an ox”.97 No defence minister was appointed, 
although the UML had been pushing for the portfolio. A 
UML standing committee member, Pradip Nepal, resigned 
in protest at the lack of consultation with the party. The 
NWPP refused to participate; Janamorcha made critical 
remarks but on 7 May announced that it would join the 
government. 
2. A Constitutional parliament? 
It is not clear if the new government is functioning under 
the 1990 constitution. The people’s movement had forced 
an essentially political, rather than constitutional, retreat 
by the king. His announcement of the restoration of 
parliament did not invoke any constitutional clause but was 
implicitly legitimated by political necessity. However, the 
House of Representatives is a constitutionally defined 
body, and the actions of the government so far have 
added to confusion over the constitutional state of play. 
Prime Minister Koirala took his oath of office from the 
king at the Narayanhiti royal palace in the presence of the 
key backers of the former royal government: the chief of 
army staff, chief justice, crown prince and chairman of 
the Rajparishad (royal council).98 In this, he went against 
UML general secretary Madhav Nepal’s public warning 
not to take the oath from the king.99 The palace, apparently 
acting on party advice, had initially announced Koirala’s 
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Post, 30 April 2006. 
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assembly will be the first agenda of HoR”, nepalnews.com, 
27 April 2006. 
appointment under Article 36(1) of the 1990 constitution.100 
However, the UML argued that this clause was only 
relevant for a majority government, not a consensus 
government. In the formal letter sent to parliament to 
confirm the appointment, it was described simply as “in 
accordance with the constitution”.101 
However, Koirala did not join the Rajparishad (prime 
ministers after 1990 were ex officio members but took 
a separate oath), and he himself administered the oath 
of office to new ministers. Previously this would also 
have been done by the king at the palace. 
The government now faces a difficult dilemma: to endorse 
even a single clause of the existing constitution might be 
seen as binding it to the document in its entirety but to 
proceed in constitutional limbo could undermine its own 
legitimacy and make basic administrative and legislative 
tasks difficult. “At the heart of the current confusion is 
whether or not the new government should follow the 
constitution of 1990 and the mundane rituals prescribed 
by it. The short answer is, it should not”, warned a strong 
editorial in the Kathmandu Post. “There is no point 
following faithfully any article of a constitution that has 
itself been pronounced dead by the [people’s movement]. 
Accepting one article would mean accepting the whole 
constitution”.102 
3. Dealing with the Maoists, the king and the 
army 
Prime Minister Koirala and other SPA leaders have 
repeated their call to the Maoists to continue dialogue and 
work together within the framework of the twelve-point 
agreement. But concrete goodwill gestures did not 
materialise as quickly as many expected. There was no 
immediate reciprocation of the Maoists’ unilateral three-
month ceasefire nor any response to the Maoists’ immediate 
demands, such as releasing prisoners.103 In the meantime, 
as outlined below, the Maoists moved quickly to take 
advantage of the government’s lack of agreed policy. 
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The mixed messages sent by Koirala’s oath-swearing at 
the palace did little to clarify the new government’s stance 
towards the king. Finance Minister Mahat promised to 
review the palace budget but if the parties appear to 
compromise with the monarch, they would risk rapidly 
undermining their new popular approval. 
Without a defence minister giving a clear sense of political 
direction, it is uncertain whether the government is 
exercising any real control over the army. The RNA has 
continued some offensive actions against the Maoists (for 
example, helicopter assaults on two mass meetings in 
Tanahu and Nawalparasi on 27 and 29 April respectively), 
apparently in contradiction to the government’s agenda 
for peaceful negotiations. Bringing the army under 
civilian control will require both firm political will and a 
determination to build bridges to the RNA leadership. 
There is little sign that the government is prepared for 
this. 
The new government has an unprecedented opportunity 
to use the wave of public support and international 
approval to establish its authority and implement the 
policies that the democracy movement demanded but 
early signs are that it is not fully prepared to exploit its 
advantages. It could quickly squander public confidence 
and find itself embattled on many fronts. 
B. MAOIST CALCULATIONS 
1. The initial response 
The Maoists denounced the king’s 21 April offer 
(Prachanda declared that his party scornfully rejected this 
“conspiratorial proclamation of feudal elements”104) and 
also termed his 24 April speech “a conspiracy against the 
people”. The second proclamation did not go far enough 
to address their demands for a constituent assembly and 
possible republic. The Maoists accused the parties of 
committing a “historic mistake” by unilaterally accepting 
reinstatement of parliament,105 which they viewed as 
violating the spirit of the twelve-point agreement; they 
were also annoyed that the parties sought to claim full 
credit for the mass movement and discount the Maoists’ 
crucial contribution.106 
The Maoists themselves had made two miscalculations: 
 They deferred resolution of their outstanding 
argument with the SPA over the roadmap to a 
constituent assembly. The twelve-point agreement 
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106 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 25 April. 
had accepted a difference of opinion over whether 
to move forward via a re-established parliament 
(the SPA preference) or via an all-party roundtable 
conference and interim government (the Maoist 
preference). The Maoists hoped they could force 
the issue in their favour as events unfolded and 
proceed straight to an interim government. Instead, 
the restoration of parliament still leaves them as 
insurgents outside the legitimate government. 
 They misjudged the king’s behaviour. They had 
assumed he would never back down and accept 
restoration of parliament. They calculated that, 
backed by the RNA, he would make an ill-judged 
attempt to finish the movement by brute force. 
This could have created a true meltdown of state 
authority and splits, or at least a collapse of morale, 
within the security forces107 – conditions which 
could then be exploited for a successful urban 
insurrection. The king’s climb down caught them 
off guard. 
Restoration of the parliament not only blocked their hopes 
for an immediate republican uprising but also enabled the 
SPA to claim a greater share of the victory. The parties 
became the primary beneficiaries of the new situation and 
felt emboldened to downplay the Maoist contribution. 
The Maoists also misjudged their policy response. They 
vowed to continue the peaceful movement and maintain a 
blockade of district headquarters and the capital until the 
declaration of an unconditional constituent assembly.108 
This was partly a bargaining stance – lifting the blockades 
would be an easy goodwill gesture to offer in early 
negotiations – but partly a genuine effort to keep people 
on the streets to pressure the new government. This did 
not work well. Many people were far from delighted with 
the initial SPA response but were not willing to keep 
up the street protests. They had suffered enough from 
nineteen days of blockades, strikes and curfews and were 
unimpressed by the Maoists’ insistence on prolonging 
similar hardships. 
When the SPA leaders, including Koirala, requested them 
to withdraw these measures, they were quick to do so. 
They lifted the blockades (while threatening to re-impose 
them if parliament did not announce an unconditional 
constituent assembly) and went a significant step further, 
seeking to regain the moral high ground by announcing a 
three-month unilateral ceasefire.109 
 
 
107 Prachanda, “Vartaman jansangharshabare kehi kura”, 
Janadesh, 2 May 2006. 
108 Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai, press statement, 25 April 
2006. 
109 Prachanda, press statements, 26 April 2006. 
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2. They will probably play ball… 
Despite their acceptance of the government offer to 
negotiate, there is no guarantee the Maoists will not walk 
away from the twelve-point agreement. Even if they stick 
with it, they will push hard for every possible advantage, 
and negotiations will be tough. But self-interest argues 
strongly for adhering to the basic framework of the deal 
with the parties. It offers the chance of limited victory 
and potential future gains, while all other options are 
unattractive. Each harshly worded recent press release has 
reaffirmed their commitment to this route. Maoist interests 
in pursuing talks along the lines already agreed with the 
SPA include: 
Protecting their political strengths. Assuming the 
parties press on with the constituent assembly, the Maoists 
cannot afford to surrender ownership of this central 
demand. The same goes for social and economic reforms: 
the more radical the parties manage to be, the less political 
space the Maoists will be left with, and all the less likely 
they could achieve their remaining goals. However much 
they have used violence to boost their movement, the 
Maoists still rely on the latent appeal of their populist 
agenda. If they lose this to the mainstream parties, they 
will be seriously weakened. 
Avoiding return to full-fledged war. A continued 
military campaign is possible but unappealing. The 
Maoists retain the capacity to fight on, and some cadres 
may prefer to stick with what they know best. But while 
the state cannot impose a military solution, it can make 
life much more uncomfortable for the Maoists than ever 
before. Rejection of a peace process would invite large-
scale foreign assistance for a renewed counter-insurgency 
campaign – which, for once, might be led by a legitimate 
government with a decent strategy. New Delhi would be 
much less accommodating, especially given India’s 
heightened fears about its own Maoists. 
Working towards international recognition. The 
Maoists have gained significantly in international 
acceptability over the past year. They now interact 
regularly with foreign officials on human rights and 
development issues and have access to key powers to 
pursue political discussions. If they reject the democratic 
path, they stand to lose this. Political acceptability in India 
has been hard-won, and many Maoist efforts have been 
designed to safeguard a possible transition to multiparty 
politics. If this is to happen, the support of important 
players such as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) 
will be crucial. It is unlikely to be forthcoming if the 
Maoists betray the trust that Indian politicians have placed 
in them. 
Building trust with the people. The Maoists are well 
aware of the positive popular reaction to their openness to 
a negotiated peace. Their stated promises to end the war 
and protect basic rights have won them respect they would 
be loath to sacrifice quickly. With one eye firmly fixed on 
the likely constituent assembly polls, the Maoists are 
preparing for elections. They have a good chance to win a 
far larger share of the vote than past opinion surveys have 
suggested but they know they need to broaden their 
support base. 
3. …But push hard and keep other options open 
The Maoists’ hope that the movement could produce a 
republic was founded on their long-standing analysis that 
the monarchy could only be overthrown by a final, violent 
insurrection. This did not happen. “The biggest losers are 
the Maoists”, claimed U.S. ambassador James Moriarty. 
“On Saturday [22 April], they were close to…getting rid 
of the monarchy entirely by a violent revolution”.110 The 
Maoists had indeed hoped that revolution was close. 
Prachanda believes that “if the movement had been 
allowed to continue for only a few more days, it was 
almost certain that the situation of Nepal’s king and royal 
family would have been no different from Romania’s 
Ceaucescu”.111 
However, the Maoists are not the biggest losers. While 
they would have been delighted if a sudden insurrection 
had handed them power on a plate, they had planned 
pragmatically for other outcomes. They remain well 
organised and highly capable of adapting flexibly to take 
advantage of a changing political landscape. This has 
consistently been one of their strong points and is not 
likely to change. Despite some miscalculations, they have 
a good track record of reading Kathmandu’s politics and 
exploiting splits and weaknesses to the full. 
The Maoists’ initial analysis is that the mass movement 
confirmed the success of their own people’s war strategy, 
which they are convinced was its main foundation. They 
believe the movement was fuelled by rural mobilisation 
and that its most important participants were poor peasants, 
ethnic minorities, dalits and women.112 They recognise 
that it did not reach fulfilment but see it as having built a 
more advanced base from which a further uprising may 
be possible. The movement cannot be compared to 1990 
in either scale or nature: the 1990 movement was much 
narrower, centred on the Kathmandu valley and driven by 
the urban middle classes.113 
 
 
110 “Nepal was very close to a violent revolution: Moriarty”, 
nepalnews.com, 27 April 2006. 
111 Prachanda, “Vartaman jansangharshabare kehi kura”, op. cit. 
112 On dalit participation, see “2 Dalits declared Martyrs in 
Peoples’ Movement 2006”, Jagaran Media Center E-bulletin 
no. 15, 1 May 2006. 
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The Maoists’ current priority is to strengthen their 
negotiating position in advance of further talks and their 
public standing in advance of possible constituent assembly 
elections. Tactical objectives include: 
 pressuring the government to proceed with an 
unconditional constituent assembly; 
 increasing their political leverage and presence 
among the general public; 
 using goodwill gestures such as their unilateral 
ceasefire to earn popular credit; 
 building broader alliances with groups, including 
other leftist parties, which share many of their 
political objectives; and 
 maintaining relations with the international 
community, even if only at the level of basic 
dialogue. 
They moved quickly to occupy newly available political 
space. Without waiting for restrictions to be lifted officially, 
their activists started addressing public meetings, even in 
the heart of Kathmandu as well as in the districts,114 and 
they immediately resumed publishing and selling their 
newspaper, Janadesh, openly.115 They began holding 
large meetings across the country, many addressed by 
senior leaders. They do not yet feel secure enough for 
Prachanda to appear in public, although they hope this 
will soon be possible.116 Meanwhile they are seeking to 
exploit the lingering discontent with mainstream political 
leaders by inciting those still willing to protest and, it 
appears, intimidating party politicians.117 
 
 
114 Maoist student leader Lekhnath Neupane and trade union 
leader Shalikram Jamarkattel addressed a large meeting in 
Kathmandu’s central Khula Manch, traditional host to party 
gatherings, on 28 April. See “Rebels press for constituent 
assembly elections”, Himalayan Times, 29 April 2006. Large 
Maoist meetings were also held after the second royal 
proclamation in Pyuthan, Biratnagar, Dhangadhi, Dhankuta and 
beyond. “Loktantrik ganatantraka lagi deshvyapi amsabha”, 
Janadesh, 30 April 2006. 
115 The 2 May 2006 Janadesh was the first to be openly sold 
in Kathmandu since shortly after the collapse of the 2003 
ceasefire. 
116 Crisis Group interview, 2 May 2006. 
117 For example, the UML general secretary, Madhav Nepal, 
and central committee member, Pradip Gyawali, were attacked 
by angry mobs – Nepal outside his own house on the evening 
of 28 April and Gyawali when leaving parliament on 2 May. 
The Maoists deny this was the work of their cadres; Baburam 
Bhattarai personally called Nepal to insist on this. “Lawmakers 
face miscreants’ wrath”, Himalayan Times, 30 April 2006. On 2 
May a small but angry crowd broke the lock of the main gate 
and tried to storm the Singha Durbar government complex, 
which includes the parliament building. Suspected Maoists 
In some cases, they are using front organisations for this 
round of mass mobilisation. These include the Loktantrik 
Sanyukta Morcha (Democratic United Front), under the 
leadership of Ram Man Shrestha, a former CPN(ML) 
member of the upper house,118 and Rastriya Jana Manch 
(National People’s Front), a new group led by Bhakta 
Bahadur Shrestha, an above-ground Maoist supporter 
who, as the general secretary of the then CPN (Mashal), 
was once Prachanda’s boss.119 
All these actions also support their current strategy. They 
will continue to prepare for a possible mass uprising 
if popular discontent grows, and other conditions are 
favourable. Maoist leaders privately warn this is the last 
chance for negotiations. If it fails they and their cadres 
will lose patience with talks.120 However, entering the 
mainstream in acceptable circumstances remains their 
safest option. They are aware that even a successful 
republican insurrection would not bring them a sustainable 
victory. But they will not enter multiparty politics if this is 
seen as surrender. 
C. THE PALACE: DOWN BUT NOT OUT 
The wording of the king’s 24 April 2006 proclamation 
implied unconditional surrender. He was forced to use the 
language of the people’s movement and invite the SPA to 
implement its roadmap, thereby surrendering his own 
plans. But the palace will not accept defeat so easily. The 
preparation for the proclamation suggests a tactical retreat 
rather than surrender. The king and the powerful networks 
around him will use whatever influence they have to fight 
a rearguard action in defence of the monarchy. They will 
probably have many opportunities to play the games at 
which they excel, such as preying on party weaknesses to 
resume attempts at divide and rule. 
The palace can still exercise leverage and patronage quietly 
through powerful networks. Foremost is the RNA, which 
was the mainstay of the royal government and whose 
commanders remain loyal to the crown. However, the 
palace’s reach extends throughout Nepal’s polity – from 
the judiciary and civil service to sympathisers in the 
mainstream parties and even, surprising as it may seem, 
the Maoists. Unless its powers are severely curtailed, the 
palace secretariat will remain at the centre of this web. 
 
 
detained and threatened a photojournalist reporting on their 
mass meeting in Kathmandu on 28 April. “Maoists grill photo 
journalist Shrestha in the capital”, nepalnews.com, 1 May 2006. 
118 The CPN(ML) was the product of the UML’s 1998 split. 
The two factions reunited in 2002. 
119 See above on the formation of similar fronts during the 
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Until the 24 April proclamation, observers who sought to 
gauge the possible behaviour of the royal government 
concentrated on the king as an individual. Factors centred 
on his pride, determination, fear of losing face and so 
on. But now those who depend upon the palace – army, 
feudal elites, relatives and clan members, and business 
interests – will rally round to protect their collective 
interests. They may form a stronger and more capable 
political force than the king has been as an individual. 
In this effort the palace will be supported, directly or 
indirectly, by the royalist political parties.121 
By the time of his second proclamation, a constituent 
assembly had become the best option for the king. If he 
had let the protests continue, the monarchy’s fate would 
have been decided in the heat of the moment by the angry 
crowds on the street. A constituent assembly may also go 
against the monarchy but at the very earliest it will be 
months before it is created and operating. In that period 
tempers will cool, and if the king plays his cards carefully, 
he may be able to repair some of the damage done to his 
image. Already at Koirala’s oath-swearing ceremony, a 
news report referred to the “royal grace and humility” 
with which the king led the frail prime minister to a sofa.122 
The wide support for a non-political, constitutional 
monarchy opinion polls have consistently reported could 
be regained – especially if mainstream leaders allow their 
own image to become tainted. However, the poor public 
image of Crown Prince Paras – who was in headlines days 
after the king’s capitulation for another hit-and-run road 
accident – may continue to undermine efforts at royal 
rehabilitation.123 
 
 
121 The Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), led by Pashupati 
Shamsher Rana, and the Rastriya Janashakti Party, led by 
Surya Bahadur Thapa, refused to support the royal coup and 
voted with the other parties to proceed with a constituent 
assembly. Nevertheless, they will not contemplate a republic 
and will be valuable, if not uncritical, allies of the palace over 
the coming months. It remains to be seen whether the RPP 
faction led by royal Home Minister Kamal Thapa – whose 
split was engineered and funded by the palace – will have any 
significance following the collapse of royal rule and Thapa’s 
ignominious disappearance from public view. 
122 “PM Koirala administered oath of office”, nepalnews.com, 
30 April 2006. The king also visited the house of the deceased 
Nara Shamsher (a close palace confidant) in Lalitpur to pay his 
respects on 30 April 2006. He made this low-profile visit in an 
unmarked private car, even stopping at traffic lights, “Kalo 
gadima raja sarara”, Jana Aastha, 3 May 2006. However, one 
week later he made a more defiantly open visit to a temple, with 
public roads shut for hours to secure his convoy. “King offers 
sacrifices at Dakshinkali temple”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 May 
2006. 
123 Kedar Ojha, “Crown prince’s vehicle clips wedding party 
bus”, The Kathmandu Post, 30 April 2006. 
Most of the world has gone cold on the monarchy for the 
moment but some friends will still be loyal. At their head 
will be India’s royal families (including those in prominent 
political positions) and the Hindu right. Major powers like 
China and the U.S. may have been frustrated with the king’s 
recent behaviour but will rally round to protect at least 
a ceremonial role for the monarchy, if only out of fear 
for possible instability if Nepal were to abandon its oldest 
institution. As with the Nepali public, the king can appeal 
internationally to a continuing fear of the Maoists and – 
despite his evident failure to counter them – the persistent 
idea that a monarchy is a safeguard against communist 
totalitarianism. 
D. DIPLOMATIC REALIGNMENT 
The first thing the international community needs to do is 
to learn from its mistakes and make sure it does not repeat 
them. That course of action – one that donors and diplomats 
have never hesitated to urge on Nepal’s politicians – would 
not only support Nepal’s democratic transition but also 
benefit its international partners. The success of the pro-
democracy movement has bought them space to regain 
credibility and Nepal’s political leaders have carefully left 
them room to recalibrate their policies. 
The likely negative repercussions of the strong support for 
the king’s first offer were immediately apparent to Indian 
diplomats in Kathmandu. “We risk throwing away in one 
day all the goodwill that we’d built up by sticking with the 
Nepali people since February 1 [2005]”, a senior diplomat 
commented. “If this goes badly wrong, it could take us 
a whole generation to recover trust”.124 This realisation 
caused confusion in New Delhi. Even as Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh, backed up in a separate statement by 
National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, told the press 
that India supported the king’s offer,125 Foreign Secretary 
Shyam Saran was executing a rapid change of course. 
At a lengthy late-night press conference, he clarified in 
response to questions from the Indian press: 
I think you should be careful not to take India’s 
statement yesterday as an acceptance of this or 
rejection of that proposal. As I said, what we tried 
to put across in the statement yesterday was that the 
principle that power should be handed over by the 
monarchy to the people of Nepal, that particular 
principle the King in his statement, in his 
proclamation, appears to have conceded. How that 
is to be taken forward…is really for the people of 
Nepal to decide.…I do not think that it is the people 
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125 “Manmohan Singh backs Nepal King Gyanendra’s 
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of Nepal who have rejected or responded negatively 
to what India has said. I think there have been certain 
sections or certain elements who have deliberately 
distorted the implication of what India has said. We 
have been and continue to be firmly on the side 
of democratic forces in Nepal. There should be no 
ambiguity about that.126 
The U.S. significantly revised its long-established stance 
on constitutional change. American diplomats had never 
accepted that fundamental change, beyond revisions within 
the framework of the 1990 constitution, might become both 
necessary and widely acceptable politically. In January 
2006, Ambassador James Moriarty insisted that: “There is 
no need to consider a constituent assembly”, emphasising 
instead that an intensified military campaign was the only 
way to deal with the Maoists.127 Following the king’s climb 
down, however, the U.S. promptly recognised the new 
political environment, stating that a constituent assembly 
“could prove an excellent avenue for the Maoists to join 
the political mainstream and peacefully help address 
Nepal’s problems”.128 
Nevertheless, serious differences of approach remain. 
British Ambassador Keith Bloomfield has complained of 
“the repeated misrepresentation in the democratic press of 
EU views in relation to the King’s declarations of 21 
and 24 April”. He insisted that: “The EU position has 
consistently favoured the full restoration of democracy in 
Nepal.…There are, of course, different routes to achieve 
the same goal”.129 However, this brushed over a 
fundamental disagreement. The EU had consistently 
favoured reconciliation between the “constitutional forces” 
of palace and parties, although it pointedly revised this to 
“all political forces”, implicitly including the Maoists, in 
later press statements.130 
The U.S. position was a step beyond this, insisting that the 
king was not only a constitutional force but a “legitimate 
political actor”.131 The parties had persuasively rejected 
this stance months earlier and realised – correctly – that 
only the palace’s concession of defeat would open the 
route to a popularly acceptable new administration. The 
U.S. position had shifted so drastically by the time of the 
 
 
126 “Press Briefing by Foreign Secretary Shri Shyam Saran on 
Nepal”, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, 22 April 2006. 
127 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 12 January 2006. 
128 “U.S. Anticipates Working with New Government”, U.S. 
embassy press release, 27 April 2006, http://nepal.usembassy. 
gov/pr_04-27-2005.html. 
129 Letter to Nepali Times, 28 April 2006. 
130 For example, “Statement by the European Union Presidency 
on recent events in Nepal”, issued in Kathmandu by the local 
Finnish embassy on 11 April 2006. 
131 U.S. Ambassador James Moriarty, speech to the Ganesh 
Man Singh Academy, 15 February 2006. 
king’s statement reinstating Parliament on 24 April, 
however, that the State Department issued a statement 
hours later: “We believe that he should now hand power 
over to the parties and assume a ceremonial role in his 
country’s governance”.132 
The king’s second offer was warmly welcomed by Nepal’s 
influential aid community, with many key donors planning 
to boost assistance. However, there are few signs of a 
coordinated approach. India, which has the greatest capacity 
to offer immediate fiscal relief by deferring debts and 
also has interests in longer term infrastructure and social 
development, moved quickly to stake its claim to a leading 
role. According to one report, it “has decided to unilaterally 
give fiscal support to Kathmandu rather than be part of 
an international consortium”.133 Norway’s minister for 
international development, Erik Solheim, flew into 
Kathmandu just days after the king’s retreat, offering to 
increase aid and push for talks with the Maoists.134 Citing 
Norway’s Sri Lankan experience, he offered its support 
to resolve the conflict if the government and the seven 
parties requested.135 He did, however, suggest that India 
should maintain its leading role and clarified that Norway 
was not seeking to mediate talks.136 Other donors have 
also started talking of resuming and expanding aid 
programs,137 and Nepali officials are beginning to make 
requests for funding.138 However, the volatile political 
situation could be further compromised by over-hasty 
injections of aid. 
 
 
132 In response to questions, U.S. officials indicated that even a 
ceremonial role would depend upon the people’s decision. Press 
conference by Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for 
South and Central Asian Affairs, Kathmandu, 3 May 2006, 
available at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/65751.htm. 
133 “King gone, India opens purse strings for new Nepal 
Govt “, Indian Express, 30 April 2006. 
134 “Solheim continues parleys in Nepal”, nepalnews.com, 4 
May 2006. 
135 “CA elections after forming interim govt including Maoists: 
PM Koirala”, ekantipur.com, 4 May 2006. Solheim is also the 
chief mediator in the Sri Lankan peace process. 
136 “Norway rules out Nepal peace role”, BBC News, 5 May 
2006. 
137 “Donors eager to extend full scale support to Nepal”, 
nepalnews.com, 29 April 2006. India is reportedly planning a 
“mega economic package” for Nepal. Bhaskar Roy, “Himalayan 
Marshall plan to bail out Nepal?”, Times of India, 27 April 2006. 
Japan has released almost $4 million for social and economic 
development projects to be run by central government ministries. 
“Japan approves the utilisation of the counterpart fund of KR2”, 
nepalnews.com, 5 May 2006. 
138 Finance ministry joint secretary Rameshore Prasad Khanal, 
representing Nepal at the 39th annual meeting of the Asian 
Development Bank in Hyderabad, told Reuters that Nepal was 
appealing for some $1.2 billion foreign aid for post-conflict 
reconstruction. “Nepal seeks $1.2 bln for reconstruction”, 
Reuters, 6 May 2006. 
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V. URGENT CHALLENGES 
A. WEAK GOVERNMENT, WILLING DONORS 
Unless and until the peace process with the Maoists 
delivers concrete results, Nepal’s central government will 
still have only the most limited capacity to administer most 
of the countryside. However rapid the political progress in 
Kathmandu, the task of rebuilding state authority and 
effective governance across the districts will be lengthy – 
years rather than months. For this reason alone, development 
assistance cannot be viewed in isolation from the political 
situation and the complex transitional processes that may 
eventually deliver a stable, legitimate government with 
legislative and administrative capacity. 
The international community can use effective support for 
a peace process to regain credibility but trust cannot simply 
be bought, and it is premature to consider injecting large 
amounts of aid as a peace dividend. Despite the desire of 
development professionals to return to business as usual, 
Nepal is far from ready to resume large-scale development. 
The primary effort should be to consolidate the peace 
process and work, under the guidance of the new 
government, to rebuild confidence in the state and gradually 
restore its capacity to govern effectively. There is a serious 
risk that unilateral aid efforts will be contradictory and 
counter-productive. A Peace Support Group that brings 
all major donors together to reach agreement on principles 
and coordinate programs is the most logical means of 
minimising such risks. 
This is not yet the time for structural reform. That can only 
come as part of the broader constitutional revision process 
following a full national debate. The focus now should be 
on sustaining and, where possible, enhancing basic services. 
Any extra resources would best be devoted not to starting 
fresh programs but to boosting existing ones that meet basic 
criteria for consolidating the peace process and are in 
accordance with the Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs).139 
For longer term assistance, Nepal needs a coordinated 
international approach based on explicit shared principles. 
Crisis Group has suggested eight as a starting point.140 A 
 
 
139 Major bilateral donors adopted a set of Basic Operating 
Guidelines (BOGs) in late 2003 to emphasise the importance and 
responsibility of all parties to the conflict to maintain development 
space and provide access to beneficiaries. The BOGs rely 
strongly on internationally recognised humanitarian law 
principles and reflect the specific conflict situation in Nepal. The 
UN and national and international NGOs have adopted similar 
guidelines. See http://www.ecdelegationnepal.org/en/eu_and_ 
nepal /bogs/bogs.htm. 
140 The suggested principles are: (i) a negotiated peace process, 
involving wide participation of civil society representatives, 
Peace Support Group is all the more important now that a 
peace process is underway.141 The changed domestic 
political environment makes it easier for the parties, civil 
society groups and other representatives to make their own 
suggestions on principles. Ensuring that Nepal’s people 
are the drivers of international engagement is critical. 
Key considerations are to: 
 make peace the priority and stick to the basic “do 
no harm” rule, while ensuring that development 
agencies abide by their own BOGs, including 
transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms, and 
thereby keeping pressure on the government and 
Maoists to do likewise; 
 consider a follow-up to the 2002 London 
conference, perhaps modelled specifically as a 
Peace and Development Forum; inclusive 
preparation and participation would be crucial. 
Nepali civil society activists are planning to start the 
process by organising their own, nationally owned, 
conference in Kathmandu at the end of June, which 
deserves support and serious participation; and 
 ensure inclusive and participatory development, both 
to address the root causes of the conflict and to ensure 
that development agencies’ activities no longer 
reinforce socially, ethnically or regionally exclusive 
models as they sometimes have in the past. 
Stability and peace must take priority over structural reforms 
and increased development. It is important to avoid rushing 
into ill-considered “peace dividend” packages since poorly 
planned injections of cash and other support could well be 
counterproductive. The new government is a fragile interim 
administration, whose legitimacy is based on popular 
support for a peace process, not a full-fledged government 
with legislative and governance capacities. Donors will 
need to recognise that development assistance cannot be 
separated from the political situation and processes, 
so political analysis should inform any aid planning. 
Finally, donors should carefully evaluate the reach 
and administrative capacity of government in the districts, 
 
 
including women, not just the armed parties and political elites; 
(ii) Maoist rejection of violence and acceptance of complete 
disarmament as part of a negotiated settlement; (iii) full respect 
by all parties for fundamental human rights; (iv) establishment 
of constitutional democracy, with sovereignty vested in the 
people; (v) an environment of complete political freedom 
enabling viable elections that reflect the popular will; (vi) full 
civilian control of security forces; (vii) establishment of a more 
inclusive political system that addresses the underlying causes 
of conflict and underdevelopment; and (viii) an equitable 
development and economic agenda that benefits the entire 
country, particularly traditionally marginalised groups. Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Crisis, op. cit. 
141 See ibid. 
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which will be at least as important as the change in the 
top-level political environment. 
B. PEACE PROCESS 
The Challenges 
The most immediate challenge is to make the ceasefire work 
– a much tougher task than it may appear. Managing a 
viable process means keeping the Maoists on board, 
maintaining unity within the SPA and ensuring continued 
popular legitimacy and buy-in. In this, as in the 
constitutional revisions to come, the government will have 
to work hard to emphasise transparent popular sovereignty 
and participation. The starting points for the peace process, 
as well as the framework for its continuation, were defined 
by the party-Maoist negotiations in 2005.142 On 4 May 
2006 the restored parliament formally endorsed the SPA 
roadmap based on that twelve-point understanding.143 
The initial efforts must build confidence and good faith on 
both sides. The Maoists started the process by announcing 
a unilateral ceasefire.144 After a slight delay, the government 
reciprocated with an indefinite ceasefire, the lifting of 
Interpol red notices against Maoist leaders145 and removal 
of the “terrorist” tag applied to the insurgents.146 This will 
allow the Maoists a degree of freedom of movement and 
peaceful assembly – something they had already started 
testing. Prachanda quickly welcomed the government’s 
offer and confirmed that the Maoists were willing to enter 
negotiations on the basis of the twelve-point agreement.147 
Demonstrable democratic control of the RNA will be 
essential to reassure the Maoists. The ceasefire will also 
need to be monitored credibly, primarily by the parties 
themselves, with national mechanisms, but most probably 
also with an international component.148 A draft code of 
conduct prepared by the Maoists has been discussed by 
the cabinet but the government has yet to produce its own 
plans.149 The Maoists must contribute to the confidence-
 
 
142 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
143 “House passes motion on probe commission”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 5 May 2006. 
144 Prachanda, press statement, 26 April 2006. 
145 Interpol red notices are issued on requests from national 
police forces in order “to seek the arrest or provisional arrest of 
wanted persons with a view to extradition”. See http://www.inter 
pol.int/Public/Notices/default.asp. Some two dozen Maoist 
activists have had such notices issued against them on the request 
of the Nepal Police. 
146 “Govt announces indefinite truce”, The Rising Nepal, 4 May 
2006. 
147 Prachanda, press statement, 4 May 2006. 
148 See Crisis Group Briefing, Mobilising International 
Influence, op. cit. 
149 “Cabinet meet to take up Maoist code”, The Himalayan 
building process, initially by releasing civilian captives, 
respecting political pluralism in practice and ending 
harassment of the families of security forces. They should 
also recognise that the countrywide mobilisation of their 
cadres – even if largely unarmed and in civilian dress – 
prompts understandable fears among the state security 
forces.150 There have been allegations of continued rights 
violations by Maoists, such as abductions and even 
killings.151 
The Maoists have demonstrated in the past that they have 
reasonable discipline and can enforce a ceasefire. There 
will be little tolerance of violations, and the government 
will expect its positive gestures to be reciprocated. 
Fortunately, the negotiations leading to the twelve-point 
agreement have shown that both sides are capable of 
orchestrating a bilateral process. The Maoists’ initial 
criticism of the parties’ acceptance of the king’s offer 
was followed by the rapid lifting of blockades and 
announcement of a ceasefire, indicating that while they 
may use harsh language, they can also offer pragmatic 
concessions. 
A peace process will be long and difficult. Each step 
will bring risks but, if managed well, could help build 
confidence. The major task before elections to a constituent 
assembly are possible is to work with the Maoists to deliver 
a convincing plan for demobilisation and disarmament. It 
is not realistic to expect this to happen precipitously or 
in a single step. The Maoists may well play for tactical 
advantages during the process – as, no doubt, will their 
political rivals – but they will also require concrete 
reassurances. 
The International Role 
The international community should help with ceasefire 
monitoring if requested and should start practical planning 
now for a small mission, as Crisis Group has outlined,152 
so it is prepared to assist both armed parties with a 
gradual demobilisation and demilitarisation process. Its 
development and humanitarian assistance should aim to 
consolidate peace by emphasising delivery of services 
and the opening of space for economic development, 
 
 
Times, 6 May 2006. 
150 Following the deployment of armed and uniformed Maoist 
fighters on major highways and at mass meetings, including in 
district headquarters, the government requested the Maoist 
leadership to cease such provocative behaviour. The Maoists 
say they have issued appropriate orders to their cadres and have 
promised to take action in case of violations. Crisis Group 
interviews, home ministry official, Kathmandu, May 2006. 
151 “Maoists kill two civilians in Bara”, nepalnews.com, 5 
May 2006. 
152 See Crisis Group Briefing, Mobilising International 
Influence, op. cit. 
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while international financial institutions should give 
the highest priority to macroeconomic stability rather 
than forcing ambitious reform proposals on an interim 
government. Donors should consider funding a thorough 
professional audit of government, palace and military 
expenditure by reputable international accountants. 
C. CONTAINING THE KING 
The Challenges 
The parties’ most immediate task is to roll back palace 
encroachments made not only since the February 2005 
royal coup but since Gyanendra started his power-grab in 
October 2002. On 3 May the government declared the 
February 2006 municipal elections invalid and granted 
one million rupees ($14,000) compensation to the families 
of each person killed during the movement.153 Four days 
later the cabinet revoked all political appointments made 
since the king’s 4 October 2002 seizure of power, including 
regional and zonal administrators, and recalled the twelve 
ambassadors who were appointed during royal rule.154  
The government will move to more difficult territory once 
it starts to review judicial and civil service appointments and 
transfers made since the royal coup. The palace successfully 
manoeuvred committed supporters into many key positions. 
Here, too, some may opt for a graceful exit: for example, the 
attorney-general and the senior officials of the National 
Planning Commission, National Women’s Commission 
and Social Welfare Council promptly tendered their 
resignations in order to avoid an acrimonious reshuffle. 
Most members of the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) have reportedly agreed to resign en masse but 
one commissioner is refusing to go.155 The NHRC has been 
placed on a watchlist by the International Association of 
Independent National Human Rights Organisations because 
of its perceived lack of independence. The Supreme Court 
had invited the king to participate in the concluding session 
of its three-day golden jubilee celebrations on 23 May but 
he has withdrawn.156 
 
 
153 “Govt announces ceasefire; removes red corner notice, 
terrorist tag on Maoists”, nepalnews.com, 3 May 2006. 
154 They are: Karna Dhoj Adhikary (from India), Narendra Raj 
Pandey (China), Prabal Shumsher Rana (UK), Kedar Bhakta 
Shrestha (U.S.), Hiranya Lal Shrestha (Russia), Prajwolla 
Shamsher Rana (France), Tara Bahadur Thapa (Thailand), Victory 
Rana (Myanmar), Rameshananda Vaidya (Japan), Abulesh 
Thakurai (Saudi Arabia), Pushkar Man Singh Rajbhandari 
(Pakistan) and Shyamananda Suman (Qatar). See “Govt. recalls 
ambassadors to 12 countries; scraps all appointments made after 
Oct 4, 2002”, nepalnews.com, 7 May 2006. 
155 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 7 May 2006. See also 
“Most NHRC members mull quitting posts”, The Himalayan 
Times, 7 May 2006. 
156 “King not to attend SC fest”, nepalnews.com, 4 May 2006. 
There have been calls from within the parties to cancel all 
royal ordinances, including withdrawing the much criticised 
Terrorist and Destructive Activities (Control and 
Punishment) Ordinance (TADO).157 The government will 
find it hard to resist such calls although it may opt to allow 
some ordinances to lapse by default.158 The instant repeal 
of TADO, however, may be more complex: it would 
require release of Maoist detainees, something the 
government may wish to reserve as a political matter to 
be addressed in negotiations. 
The government may choose to set up an independent 
commission to review the royal government’s expenditures, 
especially in the light of well researched recent press 
exposés suggesting that at least hundreds of millions of 
dollars were diverted from the state budget to the palace.159 
Several other areas have been the focus of critical attention, 
not least military procurement (in particular the suspect 
purchase of helicopters from Kazakhstan160) and the 
spending on controversial foreign trips by the king and other 
members of the royal family. The palace budget itself was 
massively increased in 2002; Finance Minister Mahat’s 
review may conclude that it should at least be reduced to 
pre-2002 levels if not further.161 
Finally, the government will have to tackle the two main 
institutional bases of royal power: the Rajparishad (Royal 
Council) and the palace secretariat. The Rajparishad, 
composed largely of elderly royalists such as retired 
generals and former Panchayat politicians, stepped beyond 
its limited constitutional role to campaign for absolute royal 
rule and threaten democrats.162 Prime Minister Koirala 
has refused to join it (as prime ministers normally would; 
see above), and it will probably be abolished, although the 
government may leave this until the wider constitutional 
reform process starts. 
The palace secretariat, however, must be neutralised 
immediately if the parties do not want to be risk being 
 
 
157 A further, but more complicated step, will be to review pre-
democratic legislation that remained on the statute books after 
1990, for example the Army Act (1959) which governs the RNA, 
and the Public Security Act (1989), which allows for detention 
without trial. 
158 The 1990 constitution stipulates that ordinances lapse if not 
approved by parliament within six months. Now that parliament 
has been restored, the conventions of the 1990 constitution may 
be assumed to apply in these cases. 
159 Kedar Subedi, “Ru pachas arba yatauta”, Himal 
Khabapatrika, 28 February 2006. 
160 Prem Khanal, “Govt buying 4 choppers with bank loans”, 
ekantipur.com, 21 August 2005. 
161 “Palace expenditures will be downsised: Finance Minister”, 
nepalnews.com, 2 May 2006. 
162 See “Rajparishad ready for confrontation: Report”, 
nepalnews.com, 5 January 2006 and Crisis Group Report, 
Electing Chaos, op.cit. 
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destabilised by a powerful competing power centre. Many 
of its key officials, including the chief secretary, Pashupati 
Bhakta Maharjan, are overdue for retirement and may be 
persuaded to move on; others could be accommodated 
elsewhere in the civil service or offered redundancy 
packages. A restructured palace secretariat should be 
staffed by regular civil servants – under the current system 
the staff is hired directly by the palace – and managed by 
a mainstream ministry with direct ministerial oversight. 
The government will need to ensure that the clearing of 
important ministry files through the palace secretariat – a 
practice that continued even after the 1990 advent of 
democracy – is promptly halted. It is particularly important 
that the palace’s military secretariat, the focal point of 
RNA control currently headed by Major-General Gajendra 
Limbu, be dismantled. UML General Secretary Madhav 
Nepal has already publicly demanded this.163 
The International Role 
Foreign political leaders should have no more meetings 
with the king unless requested by the government. U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher made the 
right start by abandoning his plans to see the king during 
his 2–3 May visit and emphasising publicly that 
Gyanendra has no future political role.164 
Countries with monarchies may still be tempted to reward 
Gyanendra for his climb down with continued engagement 
and even invitations. Any such efforts would further erode 
international community credibility. Likewise, Kathmandu-
based diplomats should resist the temptation to rehabilitate 
royal cronies responsible for the worst excesses of royal 
rule. Kamal Thapa, the ex-home minister who has been 
disowned by his own former party and who coordinated 
the brutal attempted suppression of the people’s movement, 
was still invited to the Queen’s Birthday Party at the 
British embassy on 5 May. He and other royalists such as 
Kirtinidhi Bista and Bharat Keshar Singh also attended 
the Israeli embassy’s 3 May reception. 
The international community should recognise that the 
future of the monarchy is in the hands of the Nepali people. 
There is enough work to be done to support democracy and 
no need to force the retention of a ceremonial monarchy. 
If people want it, they will vote for it; there are plenty of 
politicians who will be happy to argue the case for a 
continued royal role. 
 
 
163 “Nepal asks govt to remove ‘royal’ from RNA”, 
ekantipur.com, 6 May 2006. 
164 Press conference by Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of 
State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Kathmandu, 3 May 
2006, available at http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2006/ 
65751.htm. 
D. CONTROLLING THE ARMY 
The Challenges 
Even as the king capitulated, the RNA launched a 
sophisticated public relations campaign. Chief of Army 
Staff Pyar Jung Thapa, looking relaxed in civilian dress, 
recorded a rare interview with CNN for release immediately 
after the king’s 24 April proclamation in which he 
emphasised that the RNA was willing to work under any 
legitimate government and take orders from the defence 
minister and prime minister.165 The army also put its side 
of the story to prominent journalists: 
The Royal Nepal Army’s perception that the crisis 
in the country was fast escalating out of control 
played a decisive role in convincing King Gyanendra 
to step back from the brink.…According to a number 
of sources who spoke to The Hindu on condition 
that they not be identified in any way and that certain 
details be left out, it was the Army chief, General 
Pyar Jung Thapa, who took the initiative to push 
the palace to settle on the SPA’s terms.…Finally, 
General Thapa sent a clear and unambiguous 
message to the SPA leadership: if you form the 
government, the RNA will be firmly behind you.166 
Accounts such as these may or may not reflect the murky 
reality of the complex final negotiations that led to the king’s 
retreat. Senior RNA commanders are still loyal to the king, 
as is the army institutionally. This will not change overnight, 
especially if the SPA government’s actions fail to inspire 
confidence. Nevertheless, the RNA’s stated commitment 
to the democratic process deserves to be tested. The 
government will have to be tough and implement some 
measures that may upset senior officers but it can also assist 
the army’s transformation into a genuine national force 
with enhanced domestic and international prestige. 
The new government will need to separate the king from 
the army. There can be no more private meetings between 
the monarch and the Chief of Army Staff. The king himself 
may have realised that the time for public appearances in 
uniform has passed, and any future visits to army units 
will depend on government permission. 
Prime Minister Koirala is handling the defence portfolio 
himself. However, appointing a capable, heavyweight 
defence minister – even if only as a sign of intent – would 
send a strong signal that the government was taking charge. 
The defence ministry, largely a shadow institution, urgently 
needs talented civil servants who are seen as neither 
royalists nor party partisans. Although the serious work of 
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166 Siddharth Varadarajan, “Nepal Army chief helped convince 
Gyanendra”, The Hindu, 27 April 2006. 
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security sector reform cannot be rushed, effective civil 
servants can start preparing by familiarising themselves 
with the issues and planning how to build a viable ministry. 
A priority for the government will be putting the RNA 
under the same judicial auspices as every other arm of 
government. This means bringing military courts under 
supreme court jurisdiction. The government is likely to 
freeze all RNA expansion and procurement plans, as well 
as refuse outside offers of lethal military aid. The bilateral 
ceasefire will make it essential to dissolve the Unified 
Command and make the civil police a more effective 
force capable of maintaining law and order independent 
of army control. The creeping militarisation of local 
administration should be promptly halted. 
The government may consider voluntarily halting new 
deployments to UN peacekeeping missions until a full, 
transparent investigation into army human rights abuses 
has been completed and the court case over the diversion 
of soldiers’ wages into the unaudited Army Welfare Fund 
is satisfactorily resolved.167 At the same time, it could assure 
the UN that subject to these basic conditions and progress 
in the peace process, the RNA might increase future troop 
contributions. If peace takes hold, an RNA that might 
otherwise have trouble keeping its soldiers occupied 
could rebuild its international image for peacekeeping if it 
demonstrates democratic credentials. 
General Thapa took a significant step by stating that Maoist 
fighters could be incorporated into the RNA on the basis 
of their capability and qualifications.168 Speaking at a 
mass meeting in Pyuthan district, the deputy commander 
of the Maoist forces, Prabhakar, retorted that: “We cannot 
merge the people’s army with corrupt killers like Pyar 
Jung Thapa”. But his complaint is primarily with the top 
brass. He emphasised that he saw no problem in converting 
the RNA’s “patriotic and nationalist soldiers and officers” 
into a national army.169 In an interview with The New York 
Times, Baburam Bhattarai did not talk about disarmament 
but reiterated the Maoists’ commitment to put their troops 
under international supervision during the election for a 
constituent assembly if the RNA was similarly restrained. 
“For free and fair elections, let both the PLA and RNA be 
kept aside”, he proposed. “Let an international supervisory 
 
 
167 The fund has a balance of some $93.7 million. Ambar 
Bahadur Thapamagar, chairman of the independent Ex-Army 
Welfare Council, filed a case in the Supreme Court in 2001 
challenging its lack of transparency, which is yet to be resolved. 
Madhav Dhungel, “Jawanko kamai, hakimko rajain”, Nepal, 5 
March 2006. 
168 “Maoist militia could be incorporated in RNA: CoAS 
Thapa”, The Kathmandu Post, 26 April 2006. 
169 “Pyarjang thapajasta bhrashtaharusanga janamukti sena 
ekikrit nahune”, Janadesh, 2 May 2006. 
body keep an eye on both”.170 It will not be easy to agree 
on this but it is encouraging that the topic is being openly 
debated. 
Army officers’ repeated complaints that party politicians 
must shoulder some of the blame for their poor relations 
are not without foundation. While the parties argue that 
the army’s support of the royal coup demonstrates that 
their fears of the RNA’s partisanship were justified, the 
messy history of government-military relations since 
1990 does not fully exonerate them. The parties need to 
do more to build bridges with the military and to equip 
themselves, as well as the government’s civil servants, 
with the capacity to manage the military professionally. 
The International Role 
It is important that there be no resumption of lethal aid, 
especially now that the bilateral ceasefire renders it 
unnecessary. The RNA has its own ammunition-
manufacturing capacity and does not require outside 
assistance.171 All engagement with the military must be 
channelled through the civilian government and predicated 
on concrete steps toward operationalising democratic 
control. The international community will also need to 
maintain pressure for a full and transparent investigation 
of army human rights abuses, including adequate sentences 
for those convicted, and the investigation of all unresolved 
cases of forced disappearance. 
A key donor focus should be to improve the capacity of 
politicians and civil servants to manage the armed forces 
professionally. At the same time, governments should both 
support a voluntary suspension of new Nepalese 
contributions to UN peacekeeping missions until RNA 
human rights abuses are satisfactorily investigated and 
concrete steps have been taken to assert democratic control 
of the military, and help the RNA make the necessary 
reforms that would enable it eventually to increase its 
contributions to UN missions. 
Helping the civil police is equally important. They need 
to be strengthened so they can play a central role in 
maintaining law and order during the ceasefire. 
E. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
The Challenges 
Demands that members and officials of the royal 
government – in particular those responsible for suppressing 
 
 
170 Somini Sengupta, “Nepalese Maoist proposes that rebels 
and army curb troops”, The New York Times, 28 April 2006. 
171 Crisis Group interviews, March 2006. The RNA is able to 
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the pro-democracy movement, including killing and 
injuring demonstrators – be brought to justice have 
featured prominently both during and after the protests. 
Experiences in transitional justice around the world 
suggest two fundamental rules: (i) don’t rush: decisions 
should not be taken in the heat of the moment but after 
as wide and inclusive a national debate as possible; and 
(ii) there is no single model: the key is to reach a formula 
with broad popular legitimacy, which requires patience 
from both the new government and an angry population 
that wants quick results. 
The government has formed a five-member independent 
commission under former Judge Krishna Jung Rayamajhi 
to probe state atrocities during the April movement.172 
Rayamajhi has said that, if needed, the commission could 
also summon the then chief executive of the country – in 
other words, the king.173 Nepal’s own earlier efforts at 
transitional justice indicate the difficult areas that will have 
to be debated. In 1990 an independent judicial probe, 
the Mallik Commission, investigated abuses during the 
democracy movement that ended the Panchayat system. 
Its detailed findings identified suspects but no action was 
taken.174 At the time this enabled the country to move 
forward without acrimonious legal retribution. However, 
the reappearance of many of the 1990 accused in key 
positions under the post-royal coup government has 
highlighted the dangers of a blanket amnesty, especially 
one that was not widely discussed or approved. 
A thorough investigation – probably best undertaken by 
an independent commission – into the unresolved cases of 
forced disappearances during the course of the war must 
be an immediate priority. It ought to be possible now to 
deal promptly and transparently with outstanding cases 
of human rights abuses by state security forces. Maoist 
violations can be investigated and files prepared for later 
possible prosecutions. While dealing with those directly 
responsible for killing and injuring demonstrators in April 
2006 may be relatively straightforward, addressing the 
thousands of violations over the course of the conflict will 
be a delicate process inextricably connected to the politics 
of peace negotiations. 
Beyond transitional measures, future administrations will 
be faced with wider tasks in reforming the judicial system, 
whose unresponsiveness and perceived bias was one of 
the grievances which helped popularise the Maoists’ 
 
 
172 The members are: Harihar Birahi (journalist), Dr Kiran 
Shrestha (Nepal Medical Association general secretary), Ram 
Kumar Shrestha and Ram Prasad Shrestha (both lawyers). See 
“Panel to bring to book stir suppressors”, The Himalyan Times, 
6 May 2006. 
173 “Chief executive can be summoned: Rayamajhi”, 
ekantipur.com, 8 May 2006. 
174 See Crisis Group Report, Electing Chaos, op. cit. 
alternative “people’s courts”. As well as addressing such 
weaknesses, the independent National Human Rights 
Commission, whose current members were appointed 
by the royal government, will need fresh leadership and a 
more convincing mandate to act as an effective watchdog. 
The International Role 
Transitional justice is a sensitive area where national 
ownership and decision-making is crucial. However, the 
government could benefit from experiences in other 
countries and technical input. OHCHR is well placed to 
be the first source for advice and to coordinate technical 
assistance in these areas. It has already offered to share 
the findings of its own investigations into rights abuses 
with legitimate authorities. 
F. PREPARING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
The Challenges 
There are two headline challenges: (i) negotiating the 
remaining differences between the major political players 
and limiting the capacity of potential spoilers to disrupt 
the process; and (ii) ensuring that constitutional change 
is an inclusive, popularly endorsed and driven process, 
delivering a final constitution that is unambiguously 
endorsed by the people of Nepal. Addressing both these 
requirements, which will often be in conflict, will not be 
easy, although sustained public pressure should help force 
the political players to resolve their differences. 
That constitutional reform will be achieved through 
a constituent assembly is now hardly in doubt. Unable to 
attend the first meeting of the reinstated House of 
Representatives on 28 April due to ill health, Prime Minister 
Koirala submitted a written motion pledging constituent 
assembly elections. It passed unanimously but the process 
remains to be debated and decided.175 Although the Maoists 
have not set out a detailed proposal they are again ahead 
of the mainstream parties in planning. In an telephone 
interview, Baburam Bhattarai listed some of the issues 
that need to be discussed, including the election process, 
constituency numbers and representation of ethnic 
minorities, women and marginalised groups.176 
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176 “Nepalis deceived again: Bhattarai”, Himalayan Times 28 
April 2006. On Maoist plans for constitutional reform, see 
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A fuller list of key substantive issues includes:177 
Social and political inclusion of ethnic, caste and 
regional groups and women. Many among the hundreds 
of protestors outside parliament as it sat for its first session 
on 28 April were pushing for an assembly that would 
have unconditional authority to deliver minority rights 
and make Nepal a secular state.178 This is only one 
indication of the many demands that Nepal’s diverse 
citizenry will expect to be addressed. 
Sub-national governance. There are longstanding 
demands for devolution of powers to regional and more 
local levels. This is a popular cause that the Maoists have 
also embraced. 
Electoral reform. Many complaints about the functioning 
of the post-1990 democratic system have focused on 
an electoral system that critics claim is inherently 
unrepresentative. There will be heated debates over the 
retention of a modified first-past-the-post model or the 
adoption of other, more proportional models. 
Civil-military relations. The new constitution should 
leave no ambiguity over democratic control of the security 
forces. 
The future of the monarchy. While the choice has 
probably been reduced to one between a republic and a 
purely ceremonial monarchy, this question will likely 
remain the most emotionally charged and controversial. 
The International Role 
The constitutional reform process will be complex and 
probably require various forms of technical help. Heavy-
handed aid could compromise the essential principle of 
a people’s constitution. Donors should be guided by the 
government’s requests, avoid competing for involvement 
and be particularly careful not to impose models. That said, 
they should support a people-driven process, assisting 
where requested in funding or technically facilitating 
public consultations and a wide national debate. They 
should also be prepared to provide more detailed technical 
assistance where appropriate, while remembering that 
supporting fundamental changes on the issues outlined 
above will require a new approach to development and 
other assistance if Nepal is to achieve the genuine social 
and economic transformation its people are demanding. 
 
 
177 For detailed consideration of process and substance issues, 
see Crisis Group Report, Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal, op. 
cit. 
178 “Civil society warns leaders”, The Kathmandu Post, 29 April 
2006. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The April 2006 people’s movement is the first step in a 
long process. The defeat of the king’s absolute rule was 
essential but does not in itself resolve many problems. The 
aspirations of the people go far beyond simply revising 
the role of the monarchy. There can be no return to any 
earlier status quo: the demand is for fundamental reform 
and the transformation of Nepal’s political, social and 
economic structures. Many will resist such changes: 
for conservatives within Nepal and beyond a powerful 
democratic mass movement is almost as alarming as 
a Maoist revolution. But change must come, and the 
outside world should support the people’s hard-won 
chance to deliver a new Nepal through a transparent, 
inclusive and representative process. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 10 May 2006 
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APPENDIX B 
 
KING GYANENDRA’S PROCLAMATIONS 
 
 
King Gyanendra’s Nepali New Year message to the nation, April 14, 2006 
Beloved Countrymen,  
On the occasion of the advent of the New Year 2063, we extend best wishes for peace, good health and prosperity of 
all Nepalese, living in the country and abroad. We appreciate the understanding and patience of the Nepalese people, 
conscientiousness of the civil servants and the perseverance, courage and discipline displayed by the security personnel 
during the past year.  
Democracy demands restraint and consensus as all forms of extremism are incompatible with democracy. While facing the 
challenges confronting the nation, democracy also emphasises acceptance of the preeminence of the collective wisdom 
in charting a future course. Aware of our traditions and sensitivities, as well as the self-respect and self-confidence of the 
Nepalese people who have always remained independent throughout history, dialogue must form the basis for the resolution 
of all problems. We, therefore, call upon all political parties to join in a dialogue, which we have always advocated, to bear 
the responsibility of and contribute towards activating the multiparty democratic polity. We believe that there is no alternative 
to multiparty democracy in the 21st century and the verdict of the ballot alone is legitimate. It is our wish that in order to 
reenergize multiparty democracy, there should not be any delay in reactivating all representative bodies through elections. 
We are in favour of sustainable peace and the people’s right to vote. Democratic norms and values demand a commitment 
that the goals set forth by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal-1990 can be achieved only through constitutional 
means. It is, therefore, our desire that with the active participation of all political parties committed to peace and democracy, 
a meaningful exercise in multiparty democracy be initiated through an exemplary democratic exercise like the general 
elections.  
May the efforts at ensuring sustainable peace and meaningful democracy in the interest of the nation and people bear 
fruit during the New Year. 
May Lord Pashupatinath bless us all!  
Jaya Nepal! 
Source: Rastriya Samachar Samiti 
______________________________________ 
King Gyanendra’s proclamation to the nation, 21 April 2006 
Beloved Countrymen, 
You are all aware that, given the situation prevailing in the country then, we were compelled to take the decision of 
1 February 2005 to set in motion a meaningful exercise in multiparty democracy by activating all elected bodies, ensuring 
peace and security and a corruption-free good governance through the collective wisdom, understanding and the united 
efforts of all the Nepalese. By supporting our decision, the Nepalese people made amply clear their desire for peace and 
democracy and the civil servants demonstrated sincerity towards their duties. We are appreciative of this. We also have high 
regard for the dutifulness, valour and discipline displayed by the security personnel, upholding their glorious traditions.  
By visiting different parts of the country, we made honest endeavours to acquaint ourselves with the hopes and aspirations 
of our people, mitigate their hardships and boost their morale. We also called on the political parties to enter into a dialogue 
in the interest of the nation and people afflicted by violence and terrorism. However, this did not materialise. The ideals of 
democracy can be realised only through the active participation of political parties. In keeping with the traditions of the 
Shah Dynasty to reign in accordance with the popular will in the greater interest of the nation and people and our unflinching 
commitment towards Constitutional Monarchy and multiparty democracy, we, through this Proclamation, affirm that the 
Executive Power of the Kingdom of Nepal, which was in our safekeeping, shall, from this day, be returned to the people 
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and be exercised in accordance with Article 35 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal - 1990. As the source of 
Sovereign Authority is inherent in the people,179 harmony and understanding must be preserved in the interest of the nation 
and people in an environment of peace and security. While safeguarding multiparty democracy, the nation must be taken 
ahead along the road of peace and prosperity by bringing into the democratic mainstream those who have deviated from the 
constitutional path. Similarly, a meaningful exercise in democracy must be ensured with the activation of representative 
bodies through elections as soon as possible. We, therefore, call upon the Seven Party Alliance to recommend a name, for 
the post of Prime Minister, at the earliest for the constitution of the Council of Ministers which will bear the responsibility 
of governing the country in accordance with the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal - 1990. The present Council of 
Ministers will continue to function until the appointment of the Prime Minister. 
May Lord Pashupatinath bless us all! 
Jaya Nepal! 
(Unofficial Translation) 
Source: Royal Palace Secretariat 
______________________________________ 
King Gyanendra’s proclamation to the nation, 24 April 2006 
Beloved Countrymen, 
Convinced that the source of State Authority and Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Nepal is inherent in the people of Nepal 
and cognizant of the spirit of the ongoing people’s movement as well as to resolve the on-going violent conflict and other 
problems facing the country according to the road map of the agitating Seven Party Alliance, we, through this Proclamation, 
reinstate the House of Representatives which was dissolved on 22 May 2002 on the advice of the then Prime Minister 
in accordance with the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal-1990. We call upon the Seven Party Alliance to bear the 
responsibility of taking the nation on the path to national unity and prosperity, while ensuring permanent peace and 
safeguarding multiparty democracy. We also summon the session of the reinstated House of Representatives at the Sansad 
Bhawan, Singha Durbar at 1 P.M. on Friday, 28 April 2006.  
We are confident that this House will contribute to the overall welfare of Nepal and the Nepalese people. We extend our 
heartfelt condolences to all those who have lost their lives in the people’s movement and wish the injured speedy recovery. 
We are confident that the nation will forge ahead towards sustainable peace, progress, full-fledged democracy and national 
unity.  
May Lord Pashupatinath bless us all! 
Jaya Nepal! 
(Unofficial Translation) 
Source: Royal Palace Secretariat 
 
 
179 The original Nepali text refers not to “sovereign authority” but to “state power”. 
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